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Rethinking the Involuntary
Confession Rule: Toward a Workable
Test for Identifying Compelled
Self-Incrimination
Mark A. Godsey
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of
Rights as prohibiting the police from obtaining involuntary confessions
from suspects through coercion.' The rule itself is simple: In criminal
cases, a confession is inadmissible if the defendant did not speak voluntar-
ily due to police coercion.2 If asked whether this "involuntary confession
rule" is an understandable and workable doctrine, however, a noticeable
percentage of judges, prosecutors, police officers, criminal defense attor-
neys, and law professors would answer with an unequivocal "no."3 This
percentage would no doubt be higher in relation to those who have at-
tempted to apply the voluntariness test in interrogation rooms and court-
rooms in everyday practice.'
1. See infra notes 2, 7-11, 129-40 and accompanying text; see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 433-34 (2000) (summarizing role of voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence
through the past century).
2. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(B), at 316 (3d ed. 2000) ("This due process
test is customarily referred to as the 'voluntariness' requirement, the term used by the Court in
enunciating the due process requisites for admissibility."); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL.,
COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2303 (3d ed. 1998) ("To successfully offer an admission or
confession into evidence, the prosecutor must comply with. .. the voluntariness doctrine .... The
voluntariness doctrine requires that admissions and confessions be shown to have been made
voluntarily.").
3. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV.
859, 863 (1979) (documenting the "intolerable uncertainty ... of the due process voluntariness
doctrine"); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY
25 (1980) (suggesting that courts should "scrap the 'voluntariness' terminology altogether"); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-72 (1981) (book review)
(discussing the defects in the due process involuntary confession rule); George C. Thomas III &
Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 245 n.14 (1991) (citing numerous sources that discuss the problems with the
involuntary confession rule); see also infra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
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Basic questions concerning voluntariness and free will-e.g., whether
they exist, and if so, when they exist-have puzzled philosophers for cen-
turies and represent one of history's Gordian knots.5 Not surprisingly,
judges have fared no better than philosophers in solving this age-old
enigma since the Supreme Court first adopted voluntariness as the touch-
stone for constitutional confession law in 1897.6 The problems with the
involuntary confession rule are well-documented and legion.7 The test
requires a court to reconstruct minute details of an interrogation after the
fact, usually with the police and the defendant offering wildly varying
accounts of what took place.8 A court determining whether or not a confes-
sion was voluntary must consider any and all circumstances that could en-
ter into this inquiry.9 This includes not only obvious objective factors, such
as the length of the interrogation and whether the interrogators used force
of any kind or degree against the suspect, but also subjective characteristics
unique to the particular suspect.1" The number and variety of subjective
factors that may enter into the equation are unlimited and may include the
suspect's age, race, education, certain psychological strengths or
4. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 116-17 (1989).
Its most serious flaw, however, lay in the fact that it was a value-laden method of
constitutional adjudication that created vague, unpredictable standards which failed to
provide clear guidance to police and made judicial review a morass of subjectivity. The Court
itself openly complained of the difficulties in drawing the line between an acceptable police
tactic and a violation of due process particularly when the Court must make fine judgments as
to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of
the accused.
Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 869-70 (internal quotations omitted) (discussing difficulties for courts and
police posed by due process involuntary confession rule).
5. See, e.g., BERNARD BEROFSKY, DETERMINISM (1971); DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1970); RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE
WILL (1991); FREE WILL (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997); FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM (Bernard
Berofsky ed., 1966); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL (Robert Kane ed., 2002); GIDEON YAFFE,
LIBERTY WORTH THE NAME: LOCKE ON FREE AGENCY (2000); see also JOSEPH D. GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 61 (1993) (stating that the "effort to distinguish voluntary from
involuntary actions dates back at least to Aristotle"); M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh:
Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 328 (2003) (noting the
age-old problem of detenrining voluntariness is "an enterprise fraught with difficulty").
6. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (adopting voluntariness as constitutional standard
for admissibility of confessions pursuant to self-incrimination clause); see also Thomas & Bilder, supra
note 3, at 245 ("The paradoxical nature of the volitional-but-compelled testimony explains why the
self-incrimination clause continues to puzzle courts and commentators."); supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text; infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
7. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
8. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 869-72 (discussing difficulties for courts posed by due
process involuntary confession rule).
9. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (discussing fact that voluntariness
test requires a court to examine the totality of the circumstances); see also David R. Jankowsky & Eric
R. Sherman, Custodial Interrogations, 90 GEO. L.J. 1240, 1259-63 (2002) (outlining factors considered
by courts in assessing voluntariness of statements).
10. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 6.2(c); Jankowsky &
Sherman, supra note 9, at 1259.
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weaknesses, and even facts and events in the suspect's past life that might
have subconsciously affected how he or she reacted in the interrogation
room on the night in question." The court must then throw all of these fac-
tors into a hat, mix them up in a totality of the circumstances approach,12
reach in and attempt to pull out the answer to a question that can never be
answered with confidence by a judge, psychiatrist, or magician. 3
This Herculean task of divining a suspect's state of mind has been
called "impossible,' 4 "perplexing,"' 5 and an "Alice in Wonderland journey
into the metaphysical realm" of free will. 16 The involuntary confession rule
itself has been criticized as "legal double talk,"'7  "useless,"' 8  and
"downright misleading."' 9 In 1985, the Supreme Court, while declining to
replace the test, acknowledged that the test has many critics and candidly
admitted that the "voluntariness rubric" has been roundly "condemned. 2
Although the involuntary confession rule presents difficulties for
courts, imagine the test from the perspective of a police officer conducting
an interrogation. Factors that later might become important to the inquiry,
such as the education of the suspect or the suspect's psychological
strengths and weaknesses, are usually unknown to the officer at the time of
the interrogation. This uncertainty leaves officers without clear guidelines
11. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 6.2(c); Jankowsky &
Sherman, supra note 9, at 1259-63; Yale Kamisar, What is an 'Involuntary' Confession?, 17 RUTGERS
L. REV. 728, 756-57 (1963) (book review) (discussing Court's examination of subjective factors unique
to the suspect in question).
12. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26.
13. Did the suspect speak with free will when she confessed? Does the fact that she spent more of
her childhood on the streets than in a classroom suggest that she was not able to hold her own against
the wily, highly trained interrogators? Or does this same background indicate that she might be more
tough and streetwise than the average suspect, and thus, better able to withstand the pressure? Does it
change the equation that her father is a police officer, and that she may, therefore, be more comfortable
in police custody than most? Or does this same fact mean that she is more susceptible to police
intimidation than the average suspect, because she knows from her father's stories what the police are
capable of doing during an interrogation?
14. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1074 (2001).
15. See Grano, supra note 3, at 863.
16. See Benner, supra note 4, at 116.
17. ALBERT R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 48 (1955).
18. Monrad G. Paulson, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411,
430 (1954).
19. Kamisar, supra note 11, at 747.
20. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985). Judges and juries are frequently asked to
determine the state of mind of a defendant in limited other circumstances. For example, in the mens rea
context, juries are asked to determine whether the defendant intended to commit the crime in question.
This inquiry, however, is substantially easier to complete because both direct and circumstantial
evidence of intent is often available. Indeed, intent in this context can be inferred from objective facts
relating to the defendant's conduct in carrying out the crime or in attempting to avoid detection. As the
scholarly literature has illuminated, determining the voluntariness of a confession, on the other hand, is
a nearly impossible task. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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and hinders their ability to plan and conduct interrogations in a manner that
they can feel confident will be immune from criticism later."1
While the theoretical ambiguity inherent in the voluntariness standard
leaves police officers with little guidance in the field, in the courtroom this
ambiguity most often works in their favor.2" Given the power and decisive-
ness that a confession brings to a criminal prosecution, trial judges are of-
ten loath to find a confession involuntary.23 Furthermore, if the defendant's
confession is in the trial record, an appellate court will likely deem any
judicial mistake that works against the defendant to be harmless error.24
Thus, trial judges have a natural self-interest in favor of admitting confes-
sions. Additionally, the vast "wiggle room" inherent in the highly subjec-
tive voluntariness test offers judges free rein to interpret the facts of an
interrogation in a myriad of ways, thus making a finding that a confession
was made involuntarily very rare in practice. As a result, interrogators are
often able to apply intense pressures to suspects without rendering the re-
sulting confessions inadmissible.26
Given the pervasive problems with the involuntary confession rule in
application, it is surprising how little mainstream attention has been given
to its ascendancy to power and current doctrinal legitimacy. Indeed, al-
though the rule currently lies at the foundation of confession law, it is un-
clear from which provision in the Bill of Rights it emanates. Some believe
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause27 demands a rule that
21. See Benner, supra note 4, at 116-17 (discussing difficulties the test poses for interrogators).
As Professor Schulhofer has noted:
Because of its vagueness and its insistence on assessing 'the totality of the circumstances,'
the voluntariness standard gave no guidance to police officers seeking to ascertain what
questioning tactics they could use. Indeed, at the critical point when the police sensed that a
suspect was about to 'crack,' they were enjoined to be on guard against both 'overbearing the
will' and losing their chance by lessening the tension or pressure; in many common situations
the message of the due process test was not just vague but inherently contradictory. Under
these circumstances, moreover, exclusion of improperly obtained confessions was an
unsatisfactory remedy: the defendant's physical or psychological injury was not redressed.
Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 869.
22. See Kamisar, supra note 11, at 739.
23. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of
Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 752-54 (1987) (discussing tendency of lower courts to hold
confessions voluntary and admissible under due process involuntary confession rule even in cases
where extreme pressure was applied).
24. U.S. v. Abfalter, 340 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a variance between the
indictment and the government's proof at trial that does not result in actual prejudice to the defendant is
harmless error and upholding the conviction obtained after the defendant confessed to an element of the
crime); U.S. v. Brown, 951 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the admission of polygraph evidence after
the defendant confessed to the charge to be harmless error); Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d 1132, 1136 (6th
Cir. 1987) (finding that the admission of a wallet that the defendant confessed to having in his
possession was a harmless error).
25. See Herman, supra note 23, at 752-54; see also KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 42-44, 74-75.
26. See Herman, supra note 23, at 752-54.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... in any criminal case, shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself").
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involuntary confessions are inadmissible.28 Others claim that the involun-
tary confession rule is derived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.29  Still others argue that both the self-
incrimination clause and the due process clauses are identical in this
respect and work in tandem to prohibit involuntary confessions.3" It is as if
the voluntariness test has ruled the roost for so long that courts and practi-
tioners no longer question its source or doctrinal validity.
This Article argues that due to legal and historical errors, the Supreme
Court has unduly relied on the involuntary confession rule in confession
jurisprudence for the past century. As a result, the Court has ignored other
important values and principles that the Court should consider and ulti-
mately infuse into the equation. These values and principles should be used
to forge a new test for confession admissibility that either replaces the in-
voluntary confession rule outright or, at a minimum, supplements existing
doctrine.
Four essential points support this thesis and form the foundation of
this Article. First, nothing in the Bill of Rights requires, or even suggests, a
voluntariness test as the primary test for confession admissibility. At no
point did the Framers impose a voluntariness standard upon us and, like a
cruel joke, make the unsolvable puzzle of "free will" the unavoidable sine
28. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the admission of incriminating statements
where governmental acts, threats or promises cause the defendant's will to become overborne, thus
rendering the statements involuntary.") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Matthews, 942
F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1991) (reviewing a claim of involuntary confession under Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause); United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The
applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into
consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and
rational choice .... A statement is not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an
individual voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his constitutional privilege.") (internal
quotations omitted); United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing
voluntariness issue under the self-incrimination clause); see also David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate
Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2000)
(arguing that courts must apply the self-incrimination clause beyond adherence to Miranda procedure);
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 121 (1998) ("[ln the Fifth
Amendment 'the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
power of government,' and '[t]hat right cannot be abridged."' (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966)).
29. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating
that involuntary confession rule arises from due process); see also United States v. Valme, 182 F.3d
919, 921 (6th Cir. 1999).
30. See, e.g., Wright v. Deland, 986 F.2d 1432, 1440 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating the voluntary
confession rule arises from both due process and the self-incrimination clause); Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 174, 185
(1988) (arguing that voluntariness requirement stems from both due process and the self-incrimination
clause); see also infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
2005]
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qua non in courtrooms and interrogation rooms for time immemorial.
Indeed, the word "voluntary" and its various permutations do not even
appear anywhere in the Bill of Rights.3 Second, the involuntary confession
rule exists today because of a series of mistakes and doctrinal complica-
tions, beginning with Bram v. United States,32 the Supreme Court's first
constitutional confession case, and continuing even after Miranda v.
Arizona33 seemingly rendered the rule obsolete. Third, the text of the self-
incrimination clause suggests a standard based on compulsion, which
focuses on the objective behavior of the interrogators, rather than on volun-
tariness, which focuses on the suspect's subjective state of mind. 4 Such a
test would be more faithful and consistent with existing interpretations of
the self-incrimination clause in non-interrogation contexts as well as with
the text and historical origins of the self-incrimination clause. Fourth, a test
for confession admissibility properly based on compulsion and the self-
incrimination clause would differ in many important respects from the in-
voluntary confession rule. Although many scholars and even Supreme
Court Justices who follow conventional wisdom might disagree, existing
interpretations of the self-incrimination clause in non-interrogation con-
texts, the historical origins of the self-incrimination clause, the text of the
self-incrimination clause, and relevant policy issues all argue to the con-
trary.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the involuntary confes-
sion rule from its birth in the nineteenth century through 1936. Section A
discusses how the Supreme Court first introduced the concept of voluntari-
ness into constitutional confession law in 1897 in Bram. This Section
argues that the Brain Court seemingly confused a common law, rule of evi-
dence with the self-incrimination clause and, as a result, introduced the
voluntariness rubric into constitutional confession law. In critiquing the
Brain decision, Section B introduces the concepts and argues that both the
text of the self-incrimination clause and its historical origins support the
notion that the proper test for admissibility under the self-incrimination
clause should be compulsion rather than voluntariness.
Part II discusses confession law from 1936 to 1964, which was the
golden era of the involuntary confession rule. During this period, the
Supreme Court decided more than thirty confession cases based on volun-
tariness. This Part demonstrates that the voluntariness standard flourished
in this period because the due process clauses rather than the self-
incrimination clause controlled confession law. This Part further argues
that existing interpretations of the self-incrimination clause in the
31. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
32. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. See supra note 27.
[Vol. 93:465
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non-interrogation context, such as trials and congressional hearings, as well
as textual and historical analyses of the self-incrimination clause suggest
that the proper test for compulsion should be objective, focusing primarily
on the conduct of the interrogators.
Part III examines the Supreme Court's temporary departure from the
involuntary confession rule in Miranda and the decisions that followed.
This case returned the focus of confession law back from the due process
clauses to its rightful home in the self-incrimination clause. It also seem-
ingly rejected the involuntary confession rule, replacing it with a new,
objective test for compulsion under the self-incrimination clause that is a
distant ancestor to the test for compulsion proposed later in this Article.
Section B shows that as a result of political maneuvering, however, the
incremental gains made by the Miranda Court were soon lost and the vol-
untariness test was allowed to creep back into confession law. Finally,
Section C explains that with the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States,35
in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional requirement for
Miranda warnings, the political battles that caused the voluntariness stan-
dard to be resuscitated post-Miranda may have lost steam. This Section
argues that now that these battles are over the controversy over the
Miranda warnings have subsided and the smoke has started to clear, the
time is ripe for the Court to reassess the turbulent and unfortunate course
its confession jurisprudence has taken over the past century.
Part IV then details a new path for the Court to consider. Drawing on
the lessons learned in Parts I, II, and III, Part IV delineates a new confes-
sion test, called the "objective penalties test," based on the self-
incrimination clause, in which the touchstone for admissibility would be
compulsion rather than voluntariness. This test would hold inadmissible
confessions that had been obtained by imposing an objective penalty in any
form on the suspect to punish silence or provoke speech. Part IV develops
the objective penalties test in detail through reference to the scholarly lit-
erature in the field of philosophy, where a rich standard has been created
for determining when a coercive penalty has been imposed. Importing this
philosophical literature into the realm of confession law, this Part attempts
to create a workable standard for determining the admissibility of confes-
sions. In an effort to demonstrate how this objective penalties test would
work in practice, Part IV sets forth numerous hypothetical interrogations
and analyzes how these interrogation problems would be solved under the
newly proposed test.
35. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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The Article concludes by exploring what remaining role, if any, the
due process clauses and the involuntary confession rule should play in
future constitutional confession jurisprudence.36
I
EMERGENCE OF THE INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE:
TRACING THE MISTAKES
The role of the involuntary confession rule in constitutional confes-
sion law emerged out of the Supreme Court's first constitutional confes-
sion case, Bram v. United States,37 decided in 1897. As set forth below, the
Court in Bram introduced this test by confusing the self-incrimination
clause with the inapposite voluntariness doctrine, a common law rule of
evidence that has little relation to the text, historical origins, or policies of
the self-incrimination clause. This apparent legal error set the stage for the
confusion that has pervaded our confession jurisprudence to this day.
A. Brain v. United States: The Decision
In Bram, the defendant was a crewman on an American vessel who
allegedly murdered the ship's captain and two others on the high seas. The
Canadian police arrested him when the ship arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia
and escorted him into a Halifax detective's office, at which time Brain was
stripped and searched. 38 The detective then commenced Brain's interroga-
tion by stating:
Your position is rather an awkward one. I have had [an eyewitness]
in this office and he made a statement that he saw you do the
murder .... Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed
the captain from all I have heard from [the eyewitness].
But... some of us here think you could not have done all that
crime alone. If you had an accomplice, you should say so, and not
have the blame of this horrible crime on your own shoulders. 9
In response, the defendant made several incriminating remarks, which
the state introduced into evidence at his murder trial.4" The jury found
Brain guilty, and Bram appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that his confession was inadmissible because the
36. This Article frequently raises arguments based on text of the Bill of Rights, the historical
origins of the Bill of Rights, and the original intent of the Framers. In doing so, it does not suggest that
these resources should control our modem day interpretations of the Bill of Rights. This Article also
makes no attempt to delve into the ongoing debate as to what role these resources should play in
constitutional interpretation. The Article examines text, historical origins, and original intent simply
because most would agree that, at some level, they are relevant to constitutional inquiry. However, the
degree to which they are relevant is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
38. Id. at 537-38.
39. Id. at 539.
40. Id. at 537, 562.
[Vol. 93:465
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interrogation in question violated the self-incrimination clause.41 The
Supreme Court agreed and reversed Brain's conviction.42
The Court's decision in Bram is a significant landmark in Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence for two reasons. First, Brain made clear for the
first time that the self-incrimination clause applies to confessions taken by
the police during informal, pre-trial interrogations, such as the one that
occurred in the detective's office in Halifax, Nova Scotia.43 This point,
which may seem beyond controversy today,' may not have been so obvi-
ous at the time. Indeed, the self-incrimination clause states, in pertinent
part, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself."45 Taken literally, the self-incrimination clause could
mean only that the state cannot call a criminal defendant against his will to
testify as a witness at a trial or other formal proceeding about the criminal
charges against him.46 This literal interpretation stems from the words
"witness" and "criminal case"; when a suspect confesses to the police in an
interrogation room, he is not at that time a "witness" on the witness stand,
and no "criminal case" has commenced.
The unstated rationale behind Brain's extension of the self-
incrimination clause from the formal trial setting to informal police inter-
rogations was probably driven by the Court's desire to place substance
over form. If the police coerce a suspect to give a confession against his
will, and if the state uses the confession against him at trial, the state has,
for all practical purposes, coerced the suspect to testify against himself at
trial.47 The Court perhaps recognized that no meaningful distinction exists
41. Id. at569.
42. Id. at 556-58.
43. Id. at 551.
44. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 3, at 868 (arguing that "it should not be surprising that courts
basically have chosen" to apply voluntariness to police station interrogations); Thomas & Bilder, supra
note 3, at 258 ("Virtually everyone has given up trying to limit the prohibition of compelled self-
incrimination to courtroom testimony.").
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.., protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
be so used."); see also Brian R. Boch, Fourteenth Amendment-The Standard of Mental Competency to
Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 888-89 (1994) (observing that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause
protects individuals from being forced to testify against themselves).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461-66 (1966); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 440 (1974) ("Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be
construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against
himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited."); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
77 (1973) ("The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really
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between forcing a criminal defendant to testify as a witness at his trial or,
alternatively, taking him into the hallway of the courthouse, coercing him
to confess, and then walking back into the courtroom and admitting his
confession into evidence against him.
The second major contribution of Brain was the introduction of volun-
tariness as the standard for confession admissibility under the self-
incrimination clause. In this respect, the Bram Court quoted from Russell's
leading treatise stating, "a confession, in order to be admissible, must be
free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
nor by the exertion of any improper influence."48 Throughout the remain-
der of the Brain decision, the Court referred to this lengthy standard in
shorter forms by simply asking whether or not the confession in question
was made by "one who... could be considered a free agent,"49 or whether
the confession was a product of "voluntary mental action." 50
Applying this new standard to the facts at hand, the Court focused on
the comments of the interrogating detective-specifically the detective's
statement: "If you had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the
blame of this horrible crime on your own shoulders."5' The Court
explained:
[H]ow could the weight of the whole crime be removed from the
shoulders of the prisoner as a consequence of his speaking, unless
benefit as to the crime and its punishment was to arise from his
speaking?... Thus viewed, the weight to be removed by speaking
naturally imported a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime and
its punishment as arising from making a statement.... [The
detective], in substance, therefore, called upon the prisoner to
disclose his accomplice, and might well have been understood as
holding out an encouragement that by so doing he might at least
obtain a mitigation of the punishment for the crime which
otherwise would assuredly follow. 2
The Court held that Brain made the incriminating statements involun-
tarily in large part because of this "influence" or "encouragement."53
Recognizing that the positive inducement or hint of a benefit offered by the
detective was slight, the Court quoted Russell's treatise once again, noting
nonetheless that "the law cannot measure the force of the influence used or
Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1844 n.97 (1987)
(discussing the rationale behind the extension of the self-incrimination clause to pretrial interrogations).
48. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 3 SIR WM. OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed. Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 1896)) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 564.
50. Id. at 562.
51. Id. at 539.
52. Id. at 564-65.
53. Id. at 565.
[Vol. 93:465
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decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and, therefore,
excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted."54
Accordingly, the Court reversed Bram's conviction, and the case was
remanded for a new trial in which his incriminating statements were inad-
missible.5
B. Bram v. United States: A Critique
The standard for determining voluntariness set forth in Bram is not the
same as the more police-friendly definition of voluntariness used by the
Supreme Court today.56 Under Bram, a confession is inadmissible if
"extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight."57 The modem involuntary confession
rule, however, considers the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether the suspect's will was overborne.58 Many slight pressures applied
by the police to a suspect that would have been considered unconstitutional
under Bram's highly protective standard would now be considered permis-
sible as being insufficient to overbear the will of most suspects.59
Nonetheless, the overarching point is that the Bram Court erred sim-
ply by choosing voluntariness as the touchstone for confession admissibil-
ity under the self-incrimination clause. And even though the test for
determining voluntariness set forth in Brain is not the same as its modem-
day incarnation, Bram's adoption of voluntariness is key because it first
introduced this concept into constitutional confession jurisprudence.6 ° After
Bram, the Court never seriously questioned the basic notion that voluntari-
ness should be the standard for confession admissibility, even though it
continued to modify and tinker with what "voluntariness" means.6' This
error initially took root when the Court failed, at any point in its opinion, to
closely analyze the text of the self-incrimination clause. The self-
incrimination clause's plain language bans "compelled" confessions,62 not
involuntary ones, which would be unproblematic if the two words were
synonymous. However, this Article will argue that these two words mean
two very different things, a point the Court in Bram did not address. In
54. Id. at 565 (quoting RUSSELL, supra note 48, at 478) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 569.
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. Id. at 542-43 (quoting RUSSELL, supra note 48, at 478) (emphasis added).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. The Court had previously held in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), and Pierce v. United
States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896), that involuntary confessions are inadmissible. These cases, however, were
based on the common law voluntariness doctrine, rather than the self-incrimination clause. It was the
Brain decision, therefore, that first constitutionalized the common law voluntariness doctrine by
incorporating it into the self-incrimination clause.
61. See id.
62. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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fact, each of these terms should demand a distinct test for confession
admissibility.63
Rather than examine the text, the Court simply borrowed the volun-
tariness test from a line of early English and American common law cases
and used it in place of the compulsion paradigm textually delineated within
the self-incrimination clause.' While these early cases stand for the propo-
sition that confessions must be voluntary in order to be admissible, they are
historically unrelated to the self-incrimination clause and the interrogation
practices the self-incrimination clause was intended to ban.65 Indeed, the
Court apparently confused two distinct confession doctrines that had
evolved in the decades leading up to Bram and then used an inapposite line
of cases to illuminate the meaning of the self-incrimination clause.66 The
first of these doctrines is called Nemo tenetur, which developed in response
to harsh interrogation tactics. The second is the common law voluntariness
doctrine, which was a rule of evidence designed to exclude unreliable evi-
dence. The following two Sections will discuss each of these doctrines in
detail.
63. See infra Part IV.
64. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562-63 (1897).
65. Id. at 550-61. See Benner, supra note 4, at 65-113 (describing the common law rule of
evidence that barred the use of involuntary statements as unreliable and describing its historically
inaccurate conflation with the self-incrimination clause in Brain, which was, in contrast, based on the
concept of Nemo tenetur and adopted in protest to the inquisitorial interrogation techniques used by the
Star Chamber, High Commission, and ecclesiastical courts in medieval and early modem Europe);
Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 314-
31 (1998) (charting the independent developments of Nemo tenetur, the precursor to self-incrimination
clause, and the voluntariness rule). But see Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between
the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 109-70 (1992) (noting that early English and American courts did not frequently
recognize a relationship between the voluntariness doctrine and Nemo tenetur but arguing that the
voluntariness doctrine served merely as the exclusionary function of Nemo tenetur).
66. See Benner, supra note 4, at 65-113 (describing evolution of the two distinct confession
doctrines: the voluntariness doctrine, which was a common law rule of evidence, and Nemo tenetur,
which was distinct and gave rise to the self-incrimination clause); see also 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 833, at 327 n. 2 (Chadboum rev. 1970) (discussing the distinction between the common
law voluntariness doctrine and the self-incrimination clause); Penney, supra note 65, at 314-31 (same).
But see Herman, supra note 65, at 106-70 (arguing that the voluntariness doctrine at common law and
the concept of Nemo tenetur may not have been separate, distinct doctrines and that the voluntariness
rule may have been the exclusionary function of Nemo tenetur). This Article argues that the Court in
Brain essentially made an inadvertent mistake in utilizing the common law voluntariness doctrine to
illuminate the meaning of the self-incrimination clause. When one reads Brain, it appears that the Court
simply confused the two doctrines. In other words, the Court in Brain did not appear to have been
conscious of the distinction between the two doctrines or to have deliberately chosen to meld two
distinct doctrines into one. However, regardless of whether this was an inadvertent mistake or not, this
Article asserts that the result was incorrect.
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1. Nemo tenetur
The first confession doctrine, Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, means
"no one is bound to bring forth (i.e. accuse) himself."6 7 The doctrine origi-
nated in the ius commune, the law applied in the European and English
ecclesiastical courts beginning in the seventeenth century.68 As docu-
mented in the leading historic texts on the subject, tribunals such as the
Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission drew condemnation from
outspoken civil libertarians of their era and later from the American colo-
nists for having used imprisonment, exile, and physical torture to punish
silence and to provoke suspects to confess to heresy and other crimes
against the church and state.6 9
Foremost among these methods of extracting confessions was the oath
ex officio, which required suspects to take an oath to God that they would
respond truthfully to all questions.7" Although it may be difficult to under-
stand how an oath could constitute torture today, the religious beliefs
prevalent in this era viewed perjury as a mortal sin.7 ' Thus, a suspect under
interrogation in certain ecclesiastical tribunals effectively had a choice of
remaining silent and facing physical penalties, such as torture or impris-
onment; taking the oath and incriminating himself, also resulting in penal-
ties based on admitted guilt; or taking the oath and committing perjury,
which was a mortal sin.72 The oath, therefore, represented a form of com-
pulsion because it required its suspects to face the cruel choice between
67. Benner, supra note 4, at 74 n.50; see also Penney, supra note 65, at 315.
68. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2638-41 (1996) (discussing historical roots of the self-incrimination
clause); see Herman, supra note 65, at 106-14, 116-43, 147-65 (describing the doctrine of Nemo
tenetur, which was invoked to defend against the use of oaths and other devices of force employed by
the Court of High Commission, the Star Chamber, and ecclesiastical courts to compel confessions); see
also Benner, supra note 4, at 67-92 (describing the doctrine of Nemo tenetur); Penney, supra note 65,
at 314-15 (noting that Nemo tenetur developed as a defense to oaths).
69. See, e.g., R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 110-38 (1997) [hereinafter HELMHOLZ I]; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 34-35, 101 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing Tudor England's Star Chamber and its use of physical and psychological torture, such as
oaths, to obtain confessions); see also Benner, supra note 4, at 74-79 (discussing Court of High
Commission and Star Chamber, and noting on page 77 n.73 that the Star Chamber resorted to torture
during interrogations in "exceptional cases"). For an additional discussion of the historical events that
prompted the inclusion of the self-incrimination clause in the Bill of Rights, see generally Alschuler,
supra note 68 (discussing the Court of High Commission in England and its use of devices such as
oaths to compel confessions); Benner, supra note 4; R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1990)
[hereinafter Helmholz II] (discussing use of the oath ex-officio in continental Europe to obtain
confessions in ecclesiastical inquiries); Herman, supra note 65 (discussing use of torture in Europe to
compel confessions); John J. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994) (same).
70. See Penney, supra note 65, at 315.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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"earthly punishment and divine retribution."73 As Professor Benner noted,
"The oath ... placed its victims in the intolerable dilemma of either
'cutting one's throat with one's tongue' or suffering eternal damnation. 74
Although no records exist that shed light on James Madison's reason-
ing when he drafted the language that eventually became the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause,75 the doctrine of Nemo tenetur and
its abhorrence of the government use of torture and coercive interrogation
techniques drove the self-incrimination clause's ultimate inclusion in the
Bill of Rights.76 In a recent book that recounts the historical events leading
up to the inclusion of the self-incrimination clause in the Bill of Rights,
Professor Eben Moglen writes:
[Records from colonial America] disclose a strong array of beliefs
that physical and spiritual coercion was an inappropriate way to
secure evidence of crime. Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum was no
meaningless tag. It expressed ideas about treatment of witnesses
that were older than the system of criminal procedure of which
they now formed [a] part. It played a role in the debate over the
uses of physical coercion, casting weight onto the scale against the
practice of judicial torture. 77
Moglen then describes how popular objections to the oath and other
abuses by tribunals became "staples of the pamphlet literature" in the
Colonies during the era preceding the Revolution and later, the
Constitutional Convention. 78  Indeed, by 1765, "a fundamental-law
privilege against coercive testimonial pressure" had "embedded itself in the
language of constitutional debate" in the Colonies. 79 The notion of Nemo
tenetur appeared in several state constitutions during the 1770s and 1780s
in the form of self-incrimination clauses similar in style and form to the
language that ultimately became the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
clause.8° The texts of these state constitutional provisions often loosely
mirrored the English translation of Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum8" and
were steeped in the fundamental-law history that believed deeply in that
73. Id. For a detailed historical account of the use of oaths in medieval and early modem
England, see generally Helen Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959).
74. See Benner, supra note 4, at 75.
75. See Helmholz II, supra note 69, at 137-38; Benner, supra note 4, at 89.
76. See Herman, supra note 65, at 163-65 (stating that the constitutional protection against
compelled self-incrimination stemmed from Nemo tenetur); see also HELMHOLZ I., supra note 69, 110-
38 (discussing how Latin maxim Nemo tenetur and Framers' desire to ban practices of the High
Commission and the Star Chamber contributed to the drafting of the Fifth Amendment); Benner, supra
note 4, at 88-93; Penney, supra note 65, at 319 (same).
77. See HELMHOLZ I, supra note 69, at 122.
78. Id. at 132.
79. Id.; see also Benner, supra note 4, at 88-92.
80. See HELMHOLZ I, supra note 69, at 133-36; Benner, supra note 4, at 88-92.
81. See Benner, supra note 4, at 74 n. 50; see also Penney, supra note 65, at 315.
[Vol. 93:465
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Latin maxim.82 Moglen writes that it was the "Star Chamber," the
"Inquisition," and the "rack in the Tower [of London]" that were the
"emblem[s] of the need for a guarantee against coerced confession" in the
Bill of Rights.83
2. Common Law Voluntariness Doctrine
The second, distinct confession doctrine that developed in England
and the Colonies in the decades leading up to the Bram decision was
simply a common law rule of evidence designed to prevent the introduction
of unreliable evidence at trial.84 This doctrine held that all involuntary
82. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 68, at 2638-41; Herman, supra note 65, at 106-14, 116-43,
147-65.
83. HELMHOLZ I, supra note 69, at 137. Although Nemo tenetur was, in its earliest stages of
development, concerned with only official interrogations conducted under oath where adequate
suspicion was lacking, by the time the Fifth Amendment was drafted the doctrine prohibited the use of
oaths and other forms of compulsion even where overwhelming evidence of guilt was present. See
Alschuler, supra note 68, at 2638-60. Professor Albert Alschuler has argued that the Framers likely
drew a major distinction between interrogations where the suspect was under oath and unsworn
interrogations. Id. Due to the Framers' abhorrence of oaths, the self-incrimination clause was intended
to provide greater protection to suspects who were placed under oath prior to interrogation. As a result,
when the Fifth Amendment was drafted, the self-incrimination clause and the doctrine of Nemo tenetur
that underlies it were probably intended to prohibit only incriminating interrogation under oath, torture
during unswom interrogations, and other forms of coercive interrogation during unsworn
interrogations. Id. at 2651-52. As most historians of the self-incrimination clause concede, the internal
mechanics of our criminal justice system have changed so dramatically since the drafting of the self-
incrimination clause that adjustments must be made to accommodate these changes and ensure that the
its meaning is not lost. As our society has become more secular, oaths have largely lost their meaning
and coercive power. In addition, at the time the self-incrimination clause was drafted, criminal
defendants typically represented themselves at trial and provided their version of events in the form of
unswom testimony (placing a defendant under oath at trial would have been seen as coercive and in
violation of Nemo tenetur and the self-incrimination clause). Large investigative police forces common
in today's world were unheard of in that era, and as a result, suspects typically were not interrogated
upon arrest as they are today.
Thus, the concerns about government abuse and the focus of the self-incrimination clause and
Nemo tenetur at the time of the drafting were primarily directed at formal proceedings, which were
where abuses had occurred in the past in the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission, and
where they would occur, if at all, at the time of the framing. Because in our modem era, however,
defendants are represented by counsel and can muster a defense without testifying and pretrial police
interrogations are the rule rather than the exception, the forum where abuses are more likely to occur is
in the police interrogation room rather than the courtroom. Thus, because of these evolutionary shifts in
how the criminal justice system operates, the self-incrimination clause today indisputably applies to
pretrial interrogations in the way that it may have originally been intended to protect defendants only in
more formal settings such as the courtroom.
This change in venue, forum, and context, however, should not alter the fundamental policies
underlying Nemo tenetur and the self-incrimination clause. At their core, both doctrines prohibit
improper coercion by the government to obtain confessions. Simply put, the historical origins and text
of the self-incrimination clause, applied in the context of our modem criminal justice system, suggest
that the government should be prohibited from using torture or other offensive devices of coercion to
obtain confessions from suspects at trial or during pretrial police interrogation. See Penney, supra note
65, at 319.
84. See Herman, supra note 65, at 111, 114, 128, 133-34, 143-62, 165-70 (describing the
evolution of the common law voluntariness test that excluded confessions on the ground of
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statements are inadmissible at trial, not because of the offensive manner in
which investigators may have obtained them, but because they are untrust-
worthy."
The vast majority of cases that employed this doctrine held the con-
fessions in question to be involuntary and thus unreliable not because the
state imposed penalties or torture on the suspect, but because it offered
positive benefits, such as bribes, to induce speech.86 This doctrine was also
often applied in cases where the inducement to speak was made by a
private party rather than a government official.87 These confessions were
excluded because the suspect may have subverted the truth simply to
obtain the benefit offered.
One of the leading English cases that embody this doctrine is the 1783
case of Rex v. Warickshall.88 In Warickshall, the state indicted the
unreliability); see also Benner, supra note 4, at 92-93 (relating that the common law evidentiary rule
requiring confessions to be voluntary was rooted solely in the concern for reliability); Penney, supra
note 65, at 314-22 (explaining that involuntary confessions at common law were excluded because of
unreliability).
85. See Penney, supra note 65, at 314-22 (noting that the voluntariness doctrine lacked the
political and social justifications of Nemo tenetur); see also Benner, supra note 4, at 92-95 (stating that
the common law voluntariness doctrine was not directly aimed at deterring torture, as was Nemo
tenetur, but was concerned instead with keeping any unreliable confession out of evidence); cf.
HELMHOLZ I, supra note 69, at 153-56 (discussing common law "confession rule," which was based on
the policy of keeping unreliable statements out of evidence, and noting that this rule has historically
been "confused with the privilege against self-incrimination").
86. See Benner, supra note 4, at 98-100; Herman, supra note 65, at 156-68; Penney, supra note
65, at 320-22 (summarizing cases involving "positive" inducements); see also HELMHOLZ I, supra note
69, at 154 (noting that the common law confession rule barred confessions that had been made in
response to "promises of favor" or "flattery of hope"); infra note 118.
87. See, e.g., State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563 (1845) (confession found involuntary and therefore
inadmissible where inducement offered by employer); Territory v. Underwood, 19 P. 398 (Mont. 1888)
(confession found involuntary and therefore inadmissible where accuser offered inducement); State v.
Whitfield, 70 N.C. 287 (1874) (confession found involuntary and therefore inadmissible where
inducement offered by three citizens); Spears v. State, 2 Ohio St. 584 (1853) (confession found
involuntary and therefore inadmissible where inducement offered by two private parties: a witness and
a clergyman); The Queen v. Thompson, 2 Q.B. 12 (1893) (confession found involuntary and therefore
inadmissible where inducement offered by complainant); Regina v. Moore, 169 Eng. Rep. 608 (1852)
(confession found involuntary and therefore inadmissible where inducement offered by attending
surgeon); Regina v. Warringham, 169 Eng. Rep. 575 (1851) (confession found involuntary and
therefore inadmissible where inducement offered by wife of employer); Regina v. Gamer, 169 Eng.
Rep. 267 (1848) (confession inadmissible where inducement offered by physician); Regina v. Taylor,
173 Eng. Rep. 694 (1839) (confession inadmissible where inducement offered by a guest of the
prosecutor's wife); Rex v. Spencer, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (1837) (confession's admissibility questionable
where inducement offered by unspecified private party); Rex v. Upchurch, 168 Eng. Rep. 1346 (1836)
(confession found involuntary and therefore inadmissible where inducement offered by employer); Rex
v. Thomas, 172 Eng. Rep. 1273 (1834) (confession found inadmissible where inducement offered by
witness); Rex v. Simpson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1323 (1834) (confession found inadmissible on review where
inducement offered by neighbor and relative of the complainants); Rex v. Kingston, 172 Eng. Rep. 752
(1830) (confession inadmissible where inducement offered by surgeon). But see Rex v. Tyler, 171 Eng.
Rep. 1132 (1823) (confession allowed as voluntary when prisoner was offered inducement by a citizen
because the citizen had no authority in the prosecution; court made no mention of Nemo tenetur).
88. 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
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defendant for receiving stolen property. 9 The defendant made a full con-
fession after the police made "promises of favour."9 The Court did not
discuss the nature of the promises made, but they presumably were of
lenient treatment if she confessed, as was usually the case in these volun-
tariness decisions.9 The Court held that the confession could not be re-
ceived in evidence because the positive inducements rendered the
confession involuntary, stating:
It is a mistaken notion, that the evidence of confessions and facts
which have been obtained from prisoners by promises or threats, is
to be rejected from a regard to public faith: no such rule ever
prevailed. The idea is novel in theory, and would be as dangerous
in practice as it is repugnant to the general principles of criminal
law. Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as
inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not
intitled [sic] to credit.92
This language suggests that the Court in Warickshall did not consider the
confession in that case to be objectionable because the manner in which it
was obtained was condemnable as against "public faith."9 3 Indeed, offering
lenient treatment to a defendant as a common practice inherent in prosecu-
toriAl discretion is a benefit to the suspect rather than a penalty and should
not offend notions of civil liberties or public conscience. Rather, the con-
fession was rejected as involuntary simply because, as a matter of eviden-
tiary principle, it was unreliable since it had been obtained through a kind
of bribery.
A leading American case reflecting this doctrine is the 1845 case of
State v. Bostick, in which the State told a young girl suspected of arson that
if she confessed to the crime, she would be "sent home" and relieved of
any criminal charges.94 In holding the girl's subsequent confession inad-
missible, the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the State of Delaware stated:
A confession, clearly proved to have been deliberately and
voluntarily made, is among the strongest proofs of guilt.
But... where promises of favor or threats are used, the great
danger is, that the confession, whether verbal or written, may be
untrue; proceeding, not from a sense of guilt, but from the
influence of hope or fear. In such cases, the confession is rejected.
Therefore, a confession obtained by temporal inducement, by
threat, or by a promise of hope or favor, having some reference to
89. Id. at 234.
90. Id.
91. Id. This Article makes this presumption simply because the "promises of favor" in the vast
majority of cases in this era involved promises of leniency. See infra note 118.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 4 Del. 563, 565 (1845).
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the party's escape from the charge, held out by a person in
authority, is inadmissible.95
Thus, the concept of voluntariness at common law was not an end in
itself but only a means of predicting reliability. This sort of voluntariness
test is appropriate for a common law rule of evidence that is concerned
only with the reliability of evidence. Such a rule should engender suspicion
of any statement that was made involuntarily, regardless of whether the
police conduct in question was offensive to civil liberties and regardless of
whether the statement was induced by a government official or a private
citizen.
But this sort of voluntariness test has very little relation to the self-
incrimination clause or the policies underlying it.96 The common law cases
that established the voluntariness doctrine generally do not mention Nemo
tenetur, the practices of the Star Chamber and the Court of High
Commission, or the events leading up to the adoption of the self-
incrimination clause.97 These cases are not couched in terms of a civil-
liberties-based abhorrence of torture and offensive government coercion
but merely reliability.9" The historical data simply does not support the no-
tion of the self-incrimination clause as a gatekeeping mechanism to further
the truth-seeking function of criminal trials by banning all unreliable
statements regardless of how or by whom the statements were induced.99
On a related point, the historical data also do not entirely support the
notion that the self-incrimination clause was intended to ban confessions
made as a result of positive inducements such as bribes or promises of
leniency, where no negative penalties were threatened or applied by the
interrogators, such as those associated with the Star Chamber and Court of
High Commission that so enraged the colonists and Framers.' Positive
benefits, such as promises of leniency, no doubt raise reliability concerns
in some instances, but they do not infringe notions of civil liberties or rise
to the level of constitutional concern as do torture and other penalties of
similar ilk."°' Unreliable statements made in response to promises of posi-
tive favors are appropriately addressed by rules of evidence, the common
law, or perhaps general notions of due process fairness and the due process
concern for fair and accurate trials if a positive benefit renders a statement
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See Benner, supra note 4, at 94 ("[T]he [common law] rule that the confession of guilt must
not be the product of duress was not concerned with self-incrimination. Rather ... it reflected a concern
with the reliability of such a confession."); see also WIGMORE, supra note 66; discussion of Nemo
tenetur supra Part LB. 1.
97. See infra note 118.
98. See id.
99. See also discussion of Nemo tenetur supra Part I.B. 1.
100. See id. The distinction between positive inducements and negative penalties will be taken up
in detail in Part IV.
101. See id.
[Vol. 93:465
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 484 2005
2005] RETHINKING THE INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE 485
so unreliable that its admission would contaminate a trial." 2 The granting
of a positive benefit to induce speech does not, however, constitute torture
or even a penalty against the suspect and, therefore, does not infringe the
concept of Nemo tenetur or implicate the policies behind the self-
incrimination clause.
10 3
In any event, regardless of this distinction between positive benefits
and negative penalties, the historical data do not support the notion that the
self-incrimination clause and Nemo tenetur were intended to simply curb
the admission of unreliable evidence. While the Framers were certainly
aware of Nemo tenetur and clearly based the self-incrimination clause upon
that ancient principle, it is doubtful that they were aware of the common
law voluntariness doctrine when they drafted the Bill of Rights."° The
voluntariness doctrine appeared in American cases only after the Bill of
Rights was drafted. In addition, one commentator has noted that the earliest
English cases espousing this doctrine, while decided prior to the drafting of
the Bill of Rights, were not published in America until very near or after
the drafting of the Bill of Rights.1"5
C. Bram Court's Conflation of the Voluntariness Doctrine with the Self-
Incrimination Clause
Despite the apparent incongruity between the common law voluntari-
ness doctrine on one hand and the text and meaning of the self-
incrimination clause on the other, the Court in Brain inexplicably ignored
the self-incrimination clause's focus on negative penalties and compelled
confessions and instead announced that the self-incrimination clause pro-
hibits involuntary confessions." 6 In doing so, the Court cited and examined
the cases and treatises discussing the common law voluntariness doctrine,
such as Warickshall and Bostick, apparently without realizing that this doc-
trine was nothing more than a rule of evidence unrelated to the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause. 107 Indeed, in adopting voluntariness
as the standard, the Brain Court quoted Russell as its leading source.'0 8 An
examination of this text, however, reveals that the section of the treatise
cited by Brain Court deals only with the common law evidentiary rule, not
Nemo tenetur or the self-incrimination clause.0 9 Russell's treatise cites
102. See infra Part I.E.
103. See also discussion of Nemo tenetur supra Part I.B. 1.
104. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS II, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 532 n.c (2d ed. 2003).
105. Id.
106. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897).
107. Id. at 541-45, 547-61. For a discussion about whether the Brain Court inadvertently
incorporated the common law voluntariness doctrine into the self-incrimination clause or whether this
was a conscious decision on the Court's part, see supra note 66.
108. Id. at 541-73.
109. RUSSELL, supra note 48, at 478-79.
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 485 2005
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
only the leading common law voluntariness cases in support of the rule of
law it describes and expresses the underlying reliability policy of that doc-
trine by stating, "the only proper question is, whether the inducement held
out to the prisoner was calculated to make his confession an untrue one.""'
The Bram Court also cited several additional treatises on the law of
evidence, all of which reveal by their titles alone that they relate to an evi-
dentiary rule rather than a civil-liberties-based rule like Nemo tenetur."'
An inspection of the final treatise cited by the Brain Court, Bishop, is
equally revealing." 2 This treatise states that "the danger that a confession
will be false is the ground for excluding it,""..3 and involuntary confessions
are not to be received into evidence because they are "unsafe evidence for
the jury" to consider." 4 The Bishop treatise places involuntary confessions
in the same chapter with its discussion of the unreliability of confessions
made by the "drunk," "insane," and "unconscious."" ' This context further
illuminates that Bishop was merely discussing a rule of evidence that
excludes statements made as a result of bribes, alcohol, mental problems,
or any other situation that would call into question the reliability of the
confession.
The Bram Court also discussed, at great length, the cases that it felt
supported its adoption of the voluntariness test as the proper standard for
confession admissibility under the self-incrimination clause. 16 Again, these
cases, including Warickshall and Bostick discussed supra,"' pertain to the
common law rule of evidence based solely on reliability."' Furthermore,
110. Id. at 479.
111. See, e.g., I SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899); 2
PITT TAYLOR, EVIDENCE (9th ed. G. Pitt-Lewis & Charles F. Chamberlayne eds., 1897); FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES (9th ed. 1884).
112. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES (4th ed. 1895).
113. Id. at 749 § 1227.
114. Id. at 748 § 1224.
115. Id. at 750 §§ 1229-30.
116. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541-73 (1897).
117. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
118. Bram, 168 U.S. at 541-73 (citing Rex v. Simpson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1323 (1834)) (confession
inadmissible where the prisoner testified that she made a false confession in hopes of gaining favor;
jury heard her confession and convicted; judges later met to reconsider and found that the confession
should not have been admitted; court made no mention of Nemo tenetur, the self-incrimination clause,
the policies behind the self-incrimination clause, or any of the historical events associated with the self-
incrimination clause); Territory v. Underwood, 19 P. 398, 400 (Mont. 1888) (confession inadmissible
where suspect was told by accuser that if prisoner told the prosecuting witness "all about it," witness
would withdraw or reduce the prosecution; also that the witness would help the prisoner in exchange
for evidence against his accomplices, because the impression of these inducements made the confession
involuntary and therefore categorically unreliable; court made no mention of Nemo tenetur or the self-
incrimination clause and its policies and history). For more cases cited by Bram in which the court
deems the confession inadmissible because it is concerned that the confession was involuntary or
otherwise unreliable, all while making no mention of Nemo tenetur or the existence, policies or history
of the self-incrimination clause, see, for example, People v. Thompson, 24 P. 384 (Cal. 1890); People
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the cases are not grounded in a civil-liberties-based reaction to offensive
government conduct during interrogations. The vast majority of the cases
do not even mention Nemo tenetur, the policies underlying the self-
incrimination clause, or the events leading up to the adoption of the self-
incrimination clause." 9
It was this apparent legal error, this conflation of the common law
voluntariness doctrine with the self-incrimination clause, which allowed
the Court to throw out Bram's confession. Although Brain was implicitly
offered leniency if he confessed,"20 the detective in Bram's case did not
impose a penalty on Bram for remaining silent or to induce him to talk. In
fact, the detective did not engage in any conduct reminiscent of the
v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 (1874); Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 186 (1873); State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563
(1845); Green v. State, 15 S.E. 10 (Ga. 1891); Rector v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 468 (1882); Biscoe v.
State, 8 A. 571 (Md. 1887); Commonwealth v. Myers, 36 N.E. 481 (Mass. 1894); Commonwealth v.
Nott, 135 Mass. 269 (1883); People v. Wolcott, 17 N.W. 78 (Mich. 1883); State v. York, 37 N.H. 175
(1858); People v. Phillips, 42 N.Y. 200 (1870); People v. Ward, 15 Wend. 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836);
State v. Drake, 18 S.E. 166 (N.C. 1893); State v. Whitfield, 70 N.C. 287 (1874); Spears v. State, 2 Ohio
St. 584 (1853); Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt. 576 (Va. 1867); The Queen v. Thompson, 2 Q.B.
12 (1893); Regina v. Fennell, 7 Q.B. 147 (1881); The Queen v. Croydon, 2 Cox's Criminal Cases 67
(1846); The Queen v. Furley, I Cox's Criminal Cases 76 (1844); The Queen v. Harris, 1 Cox's
Criminal Cases 106 (1844); Regina v. Cheverton, 175 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1862); Regina v. Warringham,
169 Eng. Rep. 575 (1851); Regina v. Morton, 174 Eng. Rep. 367 (1843); Regina v. Taylor, 173 Eng.
Rep. 694 (1839); Sherrington's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1838); Regina v. Drew, 173 Eng. Rep. 433
(1837); Rex v. Spencer, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (1837); Rex v. Court, 173 Eng. Rep. 216 (1836); Rex v.
Upchurch, 168 Eng. Rep. 1346 (1836); Rex v. Thomas, 172 Eng. Rep. 1273 (1834); Rex v. Mills, 172
Eng. Rep. 1183 (1833); Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (1833); Rex v. Green, 172 Eng. Rep. 990
(1832); Rex v. Kingston, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (1830); Rex v. Griffin, 168 Eng. Rep. 732 (1809); Rex v.
Jones, 168 Eng. Rep. 733 (1809); The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 248 (1783); Rex v.
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783); Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114 (K.B. 1775).
Courts have inversely found the confession to be admissible because nothing demonstrated that the
statements were not voluntary or unreliable, all while the court made no mention of Nemo tenetur or
the self-incrimination clause. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (confession allowed where
question of possible inducement offered without witness' knowledge; the Court examined voluntariness
as measure of reliability; the Court examined the witness's words and actions on the immediate
occasion of the confession for promise sufficient to overwhelm the prisoner's freedom of will; the
Court found no inducement by the witness; the Court made no mention of Nemo tenetur or the self-
incrimination clause); see, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895); State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695 (1881); Regina v. Reason, 12 Cox's Criminal Cases
228 (1872); The Queen v. Johnston, 15 Ir. R.-C.L. 60 (Q.B. 1864); Regina v. Moore, 169 Eng. Rep.
608 (1852); see also People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384 (1857) (confession inadmissible where suspect
was taken into custody without a warrant and questioned under oath at inquest, because confession was
deemed to be unreliable by its nature and context; court distinguishes its reasoning from Nemo tenetur
and self-incrimination clause in holding that an extrajudicial confession is inherently unreliable).
But see Thomas & Bilder, supra note 3, at 254 (stating that Brain not was based solely on a reliability
concern). As Professor Benner has aptly noted, the Bram Court operated under a "veil of ignorance"
when it engrafted the common law voluntariness doctrine onto the self-incrimination clause. See
Benner, supra note 4, at 107. The common law voluntariness doctrine was "not concerned with self-
incrimination"; rather, it "reflected a concern with the reliability" of confessions. Id. at 94. As a result,
the self-incrimination clause's "attention shifted to the reliability" and away from "individual dignity."
Id. at 95.
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 532-65 (1897).
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ecclesiastical tribunals or that would have offended the policies underlying
Nemo tenetur or the self-incrimination clause as seemingly envisioned by
the Framers. 2 '
II
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
A. Due Process Involuntary Confession Rule
From the time it was decided through the mid-1960s, the Bram deci-
sion applied only to the federal government and federal interrogators be-
cause the self-incrimination clause, like many provisions in the Bill of
Rights, had not yet been held to apply to state proceedings and interroga-
tions conducted by state and local police.'22 In the 1930s, however, the
Supreme Court began reviewing a series of state cases in which confes-
sions had been obtained through means offensive to civil liberties. For
example, in Brown v. Mississippi, the first of these state confession cases,
several African-American defendants confessed to murder charges only
after having been beaten and tortured by the local sheriff acting in conjunc-
tion with an angry white mob.2 3 The confessions were the sole evidence
used against the Brown defendants to secure their convictions.'24
The Court in Brown faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the Court
wished to overturn the convictions and condemn the brutal interrogation
methods employed by the local sheriff. On the other hand, the Court was
confronted with clear precedent establishing that the one provision in the
Bill of Rights textually designed to regulate police conduct during interro-
gations, the self-incrimination clause, was inapplicable to the State of
Mississippi because it had not yet been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to the states. 125 To avoid this catch-22 and achieve
the result it desired, the Court employed a different strategy. Because the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment indisputably applied to
the states, the Court created a corollary to the self-incrimination clause
using this provision. Accordingly, the Court announced a new
"voluntariness test"--this time rooted in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment' 26-- and, for the next three decades, used this
121. Id. at 563-65 (focusing on the implicit offer of leniency made by the detective to Brain and
finding that this offer of a benefit resulted in an involuntary confession).
122. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497,
519-20 (1992). The self-incrimination clause was eventually made applicable to state actors in Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
123. 297 U.S. 278, 282-83 (1936).
124. Id. at279.
125. See Benner, supra note 4, at 113 (noting that the Court turned to notions of due process to
exclude confessions because the self-incrimination clause was not yet applicable to the states).
126. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
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doctrine rather than the self-incrimination clause to exclude troublesome
confessions." 7 The Supreme Court later described this "due process
involuntary confession rule" in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte128 as follows:
The ultimate test remains ... the test of voluntariness. Is the
confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be
used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a
particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into
account have included the youth of the accused, his lack of
education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the
accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of
physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.'29
After creating this due process involuntary confession rule, the
Supreme Court began using it to suppress involuntary confessions not only
in state cases but in federal cases as well. 3 ° The Court relied on the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in state cases"' and the
nearly identical due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in federal
cases.' As the Supreme Court later reflected in Dickerson v. United
States, "for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule
against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on no-
tions of due process. We applied the due process voluntariness test in
127. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
425, 433-34 (2000) (summarizing the role of the voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence through
the past century). The Court's reliance on the due process clause from the 1930s through the 1960s
made it unclear during that time whether Bram was still good law and whether the self-incrimination
clause was still applicable to pretrial interrogations. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963) (holding the confession inadmissible under the due process voluntariness test without
mentioning the self-incrimination clause).
128. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
129. Id. at 225-26 (citations omitted). See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997)
(discussing the history of the self-incrimination clause and the involuntary confession rule).
130. See Paul Cassell & Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive? Dickerson v. United States: The Right
to Remain Silent, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 37 AM. CalM. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (2000) ("[I]n
federal prosecutions the Court relied upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to overturn
confessions" during this era).
131. See Herman, Part II, supra note 122, at 500.
132. See Cassell & Litt, supra note 130, at 1168; cf Herman, Part II, supra note 122, at 500
(stating that as late as 1951, it was unclear whether the exclusion of involuntary confessions in federal
cases was based on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision, the due process provision, or
the common law confession rule).
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'some 30 different cases decided during [that] era' . . . . ""' During this
period of due process supremacy, the Court virtually ignored the self-
incrimination clause and the Bram decision. Thus, it was unclear whether
Bram was still good law or even whether the Court still considered the self-
incrimination clause to be applicable to pretrial, police interrogations.'34
Several aspects of this due-process involuntary confession rule merit
particular attention. First, although the Court switched from the self-
incrimination clause to the due process clauses during this era, it continued
to employ the basic concept of "voluntariness" that it first adopted in the
Bram decision. Indeed, the Court may have preferred to use the Bram deci-
sion and the self-incrimination clause to throw out the troublesome confes-
sions in these due process cases, but it could not. Instead, it did the next
best thing, which was to retain the Bram test but employ it through a dif-
ferent provision in the Constitution that unquestionably applied to both
state and federal actors.'35
Second, during this era of due process supremacy, the Court continued
to modify and hone its definition of "involuntary," making the test more
police-friendly than its predecessor in Bram. In fact, during the due process
era, the involuntary confession rule became more subjective than it had
been under Bram. In Brain, the Court had stated that "[t]he law cannot
measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the
mind of the prisoner, and, therefore excludes the declaration if any degree
of influence has been exerted."' 36 During the due process era, however, the
Court ignored its own warnings from an earlier era and boldly ventured
into an analytic quagmire by attempting to measure the level of force used
against a suspect and the effect of such force on the suspect's state of
mind. "'37 This move allowed the Court to greatly expand the levels of force
permissible before a confession would be considered involuntary.
The new due-process-based involuntary confession rule considered
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a suspect's will had
been overborne by the police conduct.' It was a highly subjective test,
which took into account not only the governmental conduct involved but
133. 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233) (1973). For a thorough
discussion of the due-process based voluntariness era, see Darmer, supra note 5, at 328-37.
134. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437 (1987)
(stating that Bram was quickly forgotten, and thus, some saw the self-incrimination clause as
inapplicable to the police interrogation setting).
135. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; see also Benner, supra note 4, at 113
(discussing the Court's move to due process because the self-incrimination clause was not yet
applicable to the states).
136. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (quoting RUSSELL, supra note 48, at 478)
(emphasis added).
137. See Benner, supra note 4, at 115 (noting that the due process voluntariness cases differed
from the Brain Court's conception of voluntariness in that the due process cases attempted to determine
the suspect's state of mind).
138. See supra notes 8-11, 122-33 and accompanying text.
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also characteristics unique to the suspect, such as age, background, strength
of character, and mental condition at the time of interrogation. 3 9 The new
due-process-based test focused primarily on the suspect's state of mind.
Objective factors, such as the pressure applied by the police, were relevant
but only with respect to the effect they had on the mind of the suspect
under interrogation.1 4° Theoretically, therefore, a particularly hearty suspect
could be deemed to have made a voluntary statement in the face of enor-
mous pressure, while a particularly weak suspect could be deemed to have
made an involuntary statement in response to much lighter pressure. 4 '
B. Involuntary Confession Rule Drifts Away from the
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Supreme Court's switch to reliance on the due process clause al-
lowed confession jurisprudence to drift further and further away from the
text and true historical meaning of the self-incrimination clause. It should
be noted from the outset that from both historical and textual standpoints,
the self-incrimination clause is undoubtedly the most appropriate provision
in the Constitution with which to directly regulate confessions because it
unambiguously speaks to the issue by banning the use of compulsion to
obtain self-incriminating statements that are later admitted at trial against
the suspect."' The Due Process Clauses, on the other hand, are completely
silent on the matter.143 It is a basic tenet of construction that between two
provisions, one of which is linguistically and semantically relevant to the
situation at hand and the other of which is not, the specific provision-here
the self-incrimination clause-should take precedence.'"
The distinction between the texts of the self-incrimination clause and
the due process clauses is important. The self-incrimination clause says
nothing about involuntary confessions-only compelled ones.'45 If the
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Kamisar, supra note 11, at 755-57 ("For if the Court means what it has said on a number
of occasions, the 'voluntariness' test causes constitutionally permissible police interrogation to vary
widely, according to the particular defendant concerned."); Ronald J. Allen and M. Kristin Mace, The
Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94 J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 250
(2004) (noting that if voluntariness test described by Supreme Court is taken literally, the amount of
pressure permissible would vary according to the strength or will of the suspect under interrogation).
142. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
143. The Due Process Clauses generally protect against the deprivation of "life, liberty or
property" without "due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
144. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) ("Where a particular Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of governmental behavior,
that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for
analyzing these claims.") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); Michael J.
Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57,
82-86 (2002).
145. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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self-incrimination clause provided, "no involuntary confession shall be
admitted against any defendant," then a subjective, totality of the circum-
stances test would be appropriate. The word "voluntary," after all, is an
adjective that describes the state of the mind of the suspect when he con-
fesses. It semantically focuses the inquiry primarily on the state of mind of
the suspect under interrogation, and it considers the conduct of the interro-
gators only in relation to the effect such conduct produces on the state of
mind of the particular suspect under interrogation.
In contrast, the term "compel," as used in the self-incrimination clause
and in the context of its placement in the Bill of Rights, is a verb that
relates primarily to the action of the government official performing the
interrogation rather than the subjective mental state of the suspect.
"Compel" has been defined as "to drive or urge forcefully" and "to cause
to do or occur by overwhelming pressure." '146 Thus, the word suggests a test
that is objective at its core because it semantically focuses the inquiry on
the conduct of the government official applying the pressure in question.
Under this test, the self-incrimination clause is violated if the conduct of
the government official objectively rises to the level of compulsion and the
suspect's confession is causally related to that compulsion.'47
Even if one is not convinced by this linguistic comparison of the
terms "voluntary" and "compelled," an objective, interrogator-focused in-
terpretation is more appropriate for two reasons. First, as discussed below,
in an uncontroversial line of cases interpreting the self-incrimination clause
outside of the interrogation context, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
term "compelled" to require an objective test focused on the conduct of the
government. Thus, Supreme Court precedent mandates an objective, inter-
rogator-focused interpretation of the term "compelled." Second, and per-
haps less persuasively, the objective interpretation of compulsion is more
consistent with the historical origins of the self-incrimination clause. Each
of these points will be addressed in turn below.
1. Formal Setting Cases
Because of the Court's strict adherence through time to a voluntari-
ness standard in confession law, it has not developed a clear interpretation
of the word "compelled" in the interrogation context.'48 In other words, the
voluntariness rubric has overshadowed the concept of compulsion in the
interrogation setting, choking off its growth and development. Outside of
the interrogation context, however, such as the formal trial, grand jury, or
congressional hearing settings, the Court has applied the self-incrimination
clause and clearly defined the term "compelled." The line of cases that has
146. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 253 (11 th ed. 2003).
147. See infra Part III.A.
148. See infra Part III.
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evolved out of this second setting will be referred to for the remainder of
this Article as the "formal setting cases."
Griffin v. California is the first case in which the Court began to
define the term "compelled" in the formal setting. 49 In Griffin, the defen-
dant was charged with murder in the first degree.15° At his trial, the defen-
dant invoked his right under the self-incrimination clause not to testify in
his own defense. 5 In closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor com-
mented on the defendant's failure to speak on his own behalf and asserted
that the jury should draw an adverse inference against the defendant for
that reason.152 The judge likewise instructed the jury that the defendant had
a constitutional right not to testify, but it was free to draw an unfavorable
inference from his failure to do so.'53 The jury convicted. 5 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that both the prosecutor's com-
ment and the trial judge's instructions to the jury constituted compulsion in
violation of the self-incrimination clause.'55 The Court reasoned that these
acts imposed a penalty on the defendant for remaining silent because they
arguably increased the chances of a conviction.'56 In this respect, the Court
stated:
[The] comment on the refusal to testify[,] ... which the Fifth
Amendment outlaws.... is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege
by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the
inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within
the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible,
and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference
into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What the jury
may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may
infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into
evidence against him is quite another.'57
The Court subsequently expounded upon Griffin's definition of the
term "compulsion" in several additional formal setting cases. In Gardner v.
Broderick, for example, a police officer was fired by the state for refusing
to testify before a grand jury investigating corruption in his department. 5 '
The Court held that this termination violated the self-incrimination clause
149. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
150. Id. at 609.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 610-11.
153. Id. at 610.
154. Id. at 609.
155. Id. at614.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citations, footnotes, and internal quotations omitted).
158. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
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because it imposed a "penalty of the loss of employment." 159 Similarly, in
Garrity v. New Jersey, several police officers made self-incriminating
statements at a state ticket-fixing inquiry. 160 Their statements were later
used against them when they were prosecuted for participating in a con-
spiracy to cover up the ticket-fixing scheme.' 6' Prior to testifying at the
inquiry, the officers were told that, pursuant to a New Jersey statute, 62 they
would lose their jobs if they did not testify. 163 The Court held that the
imposition of this penalty rendered their statements compelled in violation
of the self-incrimination clause, adding that the self-incrimination clause is
a right the exercise of which "may not [be] condition[ed] by the exaction of
a price. '  The Court applied this principle again in LeJkowitz v. Turley, in
which two architects who occasionally worked as independent contractors
for the state were barred from receiving future state contracts because they
invoked the self-incrimination clause before a state grand jury investigating
corruption in the public contracting industry. 65 The Court viewed such
government conduct as compulsion because it imposed sanctions on the
exercise of the right to remain silent. 66 This line of cases was expressly
reaffirmed as recently as 1999 in Mitchell v. United States, in which the
Court held that the defendant's silence at sentencing could not be used to
justify the imposition of a penalty by the trial court in the form of an in-
crease in her sentence. 167
159. Id. at 279. Similarly, in Lejkowitz v. Cunningham, the plaintiff, Cunningham, was
subpoenaed to testify before a special grand jury convened to investigate his alleged improper conduct
in the political offices he had held, which consisted of elected positions in the Democratic Party of the
State of New York. 431 U.S. 801, 803 (1977). Cunningham refused to testify on Fifth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 804. Under a New York statute, Cunningham's invocation of his rights under the self-
incrimination clause automatically divested him of all his party offices, and activated a five-year ban on
holding any public or party office. Id. at 803. Cunningham then filed a civil suit in federal court,
alleging that the New York statute was unconstitutional because it penalized the invocation of his right
to remain silent. Id. at 804. After the lower courts agreed with Cunningham, the Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court stated: "[W]hen a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict
potential sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot be used against the declarant in a subsequent criminal
prosecution." Id. at 805.
160. 385 U.S. 493,495 (1967).
161. Id.
162. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 81-17.1 (repealed 1970); Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494-95 n.1.
163. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494.
164. Id. at 500.
165. 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973).
166. Id.
167. 526 U.S. 314, 328-30 (1999). For an additional discussion of the formal setting cases, see
generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001); Shannon T. Noya, Comment, Hoisted by Their Own Petard: Adverse
Inferences in Civil Forfeiture, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493 (1996); Anthony J. Phelps, Note,
Applicability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Sentencing: Mitchell v.
United States Settles the Conflict, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 107 (2000).
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Although various aspects of these cases will be discussed throughout
the remainder of this Article, two points concerning the Court's interpreta-
tion of "compulsion" in the formal setting cases are noteworthy at this
juncture. First, these cases make clear that the test for compulsion is
objective.168 The Court did not apply a subjective totality of circumstances
test in any of these cases, such as that associated with the due process
involuntary confession rule,169 to determine if compulsion was present. 7
The Court made no inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant or
whether the defendant in question actually felt compulsion. Indeed, in
Garrity, the Court ignored the facts (which Justice Harlan noted in his dis-
sent) that, at the inquiry, "all of the officers were advised they had a right
to remain silent, three of the officers were represented by counsel, a fourth
officer had decided that counsel was not necessary, the interrogation took
place in familiar surroundings, and the interrogation was both brief and
civilized.' ' 71
Second, the Court interpreted the self-incrimination clause in these
formal setting cases to prohibit the government's imposition of what I will
call "objective penalties" in response to silence or to provoke speech,'72
regardless of the severity of the penalty.173 In each of these cases, the pen-
alty could be objectively identified and articulated from the record as an
actual and concrete penalty: a comment that increased the chance of a
conviction, the loss of a job, the loss of future state contracts, etc.
Furthermore, the Court did not consider relevant whether the speaker actu-
ally felt the identifiable penalty. The loss of future state contracts in Turley,
for example, was considered a penalty regardless of whether the architects
intended to seek state contracts in the future or whether the loss of such
contracts would affect their income.' 4
2. Historical Origins of the Self-Incrimination Clause
The second argument in favor of an objective interpretation of the
word "compelled" and against a subjective voluntariness analysis can be
found in the historical data. Indeed, nothing in the scholarly literature sug-
gests that the Framers intended to create a sliding scale that adjusts the
amount of force permitted based on characteristics unique to each suspect,
such as the test associated with the due process involuntary confession rule.
As recounted in Part I.A, the historical events leading up to the inclusion of
168. See Herman, Part II, supra note 122, at 503.
169. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A.
170. See Herman, Part II, supra note 122, at 503.
171. Id. (citing Garrity, 385 U.S. at 502-06 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
172. See supra notes 149-71; infra Part I.A.
173. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967); see also supra notes 149-71; infra Part
ILA; infra Part IV.A.1; infra note 306.
174. See supra Part ILB. 1; infra Part ILA; infra Part IV.A. 1.
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the self-incrimination clause in the Bill of Rights reflect the simple desire
of the Framers to prohibit the government's use of torture and other coer-
cive tactics in response to silence or to provoke speech. For example, the
American colonists and the Framers objected to the use of the oath ex
officio and seemingly did not inquire into whether the oath was permissible
in individual cases in which the suspect's heretical religious beliefs or lack
of religious fervor, which was often the reason the suspect was being inter-
rogated in the first place, stripped the oath of its torturous qualities.
Likewise, the Framers were incensed by the use of imprisonment, exile,
and other penalties that the ecclesiastical tribunals of Europe imposed on
those under interrogation. Objections to these penalties were made without
regard to the state of mind of particular suspects who may have been able
to withstand such treatment in individual cases.'75
This point is illustrated to some extent by reference to the case of John
Lilburne, who did more to ensure widespread public support for the doc-
trine of Nemo tenetur, and ultimately the self-incrimination clause, than
perhaps any other individual in history.'76 Lilburne was a Puritan who in
1637 was brought before the Star Chamber on three separate occasions for
allegedly smuggling heretical and seditious books into England.'77 Each
time he appeared, Lilbume refused to take the oath and incriminate him-
self, arguing that the Star Chamber's interrogation techniques were
illegitimate. 78 In response, the Star Chamber imprisoned Lilburne indefi-
nitely, fined him 500 pounds, and required that he be whipped and placed
in the pillory.'79 The whipping that Lilbume received during his march
from the prison to the pillory was a public spectacle. 80 Upon arriving at the
pillory, he gave a public address condemning the interrogation techniques
of the Star Chamber.' 8'
Lilburne's case generated great public opposition to the use of torture
during interrogations, which ultimately resulted in the abolition of the
Court of High Commission and Star Chamber in 1641.182 Nevertheless, the
fact that Lilburne withstood the pressure and did not confess to the Star
Chamber seemingly had no bearing on the opposition engendered against
the interrogation techniques used against him. Likewise, the historical
records do not give even a passing thought to the idea that the
175. See supra note 174; infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text; infra Part ILA; infra Part
IVAL.
176. See Benner, supra note 4, at 77.
177. Id. at 77-78.
178. Id. at 78-79 (Lilburne's specific complaint was that the Star Chamber did not inform him of
the charges against him).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 79.
181. Id.
182. Id.
[Vol. 93:465
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offensiveness of certain interrogation techniques depends on the strength or
weakness of the person interrogated.
One might fairly attempt to challenge this historical argument by not-
ing that the interrogation techniques of past centuries were so brutal that
they could be deemed objectionable and impermissible per se when used
against any person in any circumstance. Consequently, there was no need
in that era to consider what effect particular interrogation techniques had
on the state of mind of particular suspects. In today's world, the argument
would go, the Supreme Court routinely attempts to regulate interrogation
techniques that are more subtle and may not always be objectionable in
every case. Thus, we must now make an inquiry into the state of mind of
each suspect to determine what effect such subtle coercion had on her abil-
ity to withstand the pressure in question.
Notwithstanding the merits of the above argument in other contexts, it
holds little weight with respect to the historical objections to the oath. The
oath was the primary device of torture that gave rise to the self-
incrimination clause,1 83 yet it evinced none of the characteristics of torture
when imposed on a suspect who did not believe in its religious power.
Since those brought before the ecclesiastical tribunals that utilized the oath
were often religious dissenters or nonbelievers, 1"4 it is more than likely that
some under interrogation would not have felt the oath's religious signifi-
cance and thus its coercive power. Yet this fact apparently made no differ-
ence, as the objections universally sounded against the use of the oath at
all,'5 because it was generally deemed an offensive and objectionable in-
terrogation technique during that period.
Thus, the Framers were aware of interrogation devices---certain
objective penalties-that were utilized by those in authority in past centu-
ries to obtain confessions. By including a provision in the Bill of Rights
barring the government's use of compulsion to obtain statements, they pre-
sumably intended to hold inadmissible all confessions obtained by the gov-
ernment through the imposition of such penalties, regardless of the
subjective strengths and weaknesses of the suspect under interrogation.18 6
3. Causes for the Departure from Self-Incrimination Clause's True
Meaning
The Court's move away from an objective test for compulsion focused
on the interrogator and toward a subjective voluntariness test focused on
the state of mind of the suspect can be attributed to several factors. First
183. LEVY, supra note 69, at 43-82.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Penney, supra note 65, at 319 (stating that the Framers included the self-incrimination
clause in the Bill of Rights to prohibit the use of objective penalties such as "ex officio procedures or
judicial torture" that were prevalent in "Medieval and Renaissance Europe").
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and most obviously, one can look to the Bram decision, because it was in
Bram that the Court first introduced the concept of voluntariness into the
equation. 7 Further, Brain incorporated the common law voluntariness
doctrine based on the policy of reliability into confession law.' Indeed,
one of the many policies in the "complex of values"'8 9 woven throughout
the confession cases in the due process era was an emphasis on ensuring
that all confessions admitted into evidence were reliable and trustworthy. 90
This policy concern was unrelated to Nemo tenetur and the self-
incrimination clause that first asserted itself in Bram when the Court en-
grafted the common law voluntariness doctrine into confession jurispru-
dence.' 9 Indeed, if one is concerned with making sure that all evidence
admitted at trial is reliable, then one should be concerned with any matter
that might render testimony unreliable-from government conduct to the
speaker's subjective mental state and from positive inducements to nega-
tive penalties. Such a policy perspective calls for a subjective totality of the
circumstances approach requiring an examination of all the factors that
may render a statement unreliable. A subjective voluntariness analysis is an
appropriate test for this purpose because it adequately captures the underly-
ing policy.
The problems that arose during the due process era can be blamed not
only on Bram, however, but also on the Court's switch in the 1930s from
the self-incrimination clause to due process. Had the Court retained its
187. See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
188. See id.
189. Benner, supra note 4, at 116; see also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
190. As the due process involuntary confession rule evolved, the Court embraced a variety of
policies to support it; primary among them was the policy of reliability. See Martin R. Gardner, The
Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 444-45
(1984) (discussing reliability and fairness); Grano, supra note 3, at 891-924 (discussing policies
underlying the due process involuntary confession rule, including reliability, fairness, a concern for
mental freedom, and deterrence of offensive police practices); Herman, Part I, supra note 65, at 134,
150, 161, 187-88 (ensuring reliability protects interests of autonomy, privacy and dignity, because it
protects against convicting the innocent); Herman, Part II, supra note 122, at 515-16 (discussing
dominance of reliability policy, but also recognizing: (1) deterrence of offensive police
conduct, (2) preference for accusatorial rather than inquisitorial interrogation
techniques, (3) protecting personal autonomy); Herman, supra note 23, at 750 (discussing reliability
and deterring offensive police conduct); see also Penney, supra note 65, at 313 (discussing the
dominant role reliability has played in evolution of the due process involuntary confession rule and
stating that through time the Court has embraced different policies as underlying constitutional
confession law, in addition to reliability, including preventing abusive interrogation techniques and
protecting the right of suspects to make autonomous decisions); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 867-68
(discussing reliability, fairness, and a preference for an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of
justice as policies underlying involuntary confession rule); cf Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow,
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 859 (1995)
(arguing that reliability should be the touchstone rationale of the self-incrimination clause); Yale
Kamisar, Response: On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 929, 936-49 (1995) (responding to Amar and Lettow and arguing that the
reliability policy is not at the foundation of the self-incrimination clause).
191. See supra Part LB-C.
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focus on the self-incrimination clause, the fact that Bram had deviated from
the text and history of the self-incrimination clause might have come to
light as the Court continued to refine its analysis. But the linguistically
vague due process clauses provided no textual or historical tether to keep
the Court in check.
III
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND ITS AFTERMATH
Due to the highly subjective and unworkable nature of the voluntari-
ness test, discussed in detail supra, police officers had a difficult time ap-
plying it in the field, and the Court saw repeated violations of the rule.
Consequently, the Court became dissatisfied with the due process standard
and began looking for a substitute doctrine in the mid-1960s.'92 After ex-
perimenting with the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel,'93 the Court
found a replacement in Miranda v. Arizona.'94
A. Miranda v. Arizona: The Decision
The Miranda decision represented a monumental departure from the
past, in several important respects. In reversing the convictions of Mr.
Ernesto Miranda and the defendants in the companion cases, the Court
chose, for the first time in decades, not to focus on notions of due process
and the involuntary confession rule.'95 Instead, the Court in Miranda fo-
cused on the self-incrimination clause and recognized that the proper test
for confession admissibility in the Bill of Rights is the self-incrimination
clause's ban on compelled statements, which prohibits the police from
192. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. ITT. L. REV.
227 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for "bright-line" criminal procedure rules);
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 321-23 (1982) (same); Benner, supra note 4, at 115
(suggesting that the due process test was difficult to apply because it required a court to determine, as a
matter of "psychological fact," whether the defendant's will had been overborne); Gardner, supra note
190, at 446-47 (discussing the Supreme Court's search for a substitute to the due process involuntary
confession rule); Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law-The
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from Non-
Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 861 (2003); Herman, supra note 23, at 754-55; Schulhofer, supra
note 3, at 869-75 (discussing difficulties for courts posed by the due process involuntary confession
rule); see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
193. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The decision held that:
[W]here... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
194. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
195. Id. at 461-65.
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using compulsion to obtain confessions that are later used against the con-
fessor. 19
6
In attempting to define compulsion in the interrogation context, the
Miranda Court focused on the fact that each of the defendants had been
interrogated while in police custody. Recognizing that the officers did not
employ any "third-degree" tactics during the interrogations in question, the
Court nonetheless held that the mere act of custodial interrogation consti-
tutes compulsion. 97 In other words, the simple act of asking a question to a
detained suspect, by itself, creates an inherently coercive atmosphere and,
therefore, applies the type of compulsion banned by the self-incrimination
clause. 198 Thus, the Court in Miranda undeniably interpreted the term
"compelled" very broadly. As the Court itself acknowledged, this new
interpretation of "compelled" under the self-incrimination clause was more
protective of suspects under interrogation than was the previous due
process voluntariness standard.199
Despite this holding that custodial interrogation equates with imper-
missible compulsion, the Court in Miranda did not completely ban the
long-standing police practice of custodial interrogation. Rather, the Court
held that a police officer may permissibly interrogate a suspect in custody
if he first takes appropriate steps to dispel the inherent atmospheric pres-
sure so that the suspect will no longer feel compelled to confess."' 0 The
pressure can be dissipated by informing the suspect of her now-famous
Miranda rights. If the officer informs the suspect of her rights and obtains a
voluntary waiver of those rights, he may commence with the interrogation
without necessarily running afoul of the self-incrimination clause. If the
officer does not employ the warning/waiver mechanism, any resulting con-
fession will be deemed an inadmissible confession tainted by the presence
of compulsion."0'
196. Id. at 462.
197. Id. at 467.
198. Id. at 467-74; see also Schulhofer, supra note 134, at 436 (discussing the Miranda Court's
definition of compulsion and its equation with custodial interrogation).
199. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57 (acknowledging that the confessions suppressed in Miranda
and its companion cases might not be "involuntary in traditional terms"); see also Penney, supra note
65, at 369 (stating that the Miranda Court's definition of "compulsion" was different than the meaning
of "involuntary").
200. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-74.
201. Id. at 476 (stating that the warnings are a "prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement
made by a defendant"). This aspect of the Miranda holding has been widely criticized as paradoxical.
See Penney, supra note 65, at 311 ("Stated simply, opponents argue that Miranda's conclusion that
custodial interrogation is inherently coercive is impossible to reconcile with its holding that this
coercion is dissipated by the recitation of rights by the police."); see also Gerald M. Caplan,
Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1449 (1985) (comparing Miranda to the ineffectual
caution printed on cigarette packages); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-
And the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 78 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 726-27 (1988)
(arguing that because the pressures that compel the accused to confess bear equally on the decision to
waive his right to silence, "any evidentiary use of interrogation's fruits, even when warnings were
[Vol. 93:465
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Miranda stands as a watershed decision in the history of constitutional
confession law not simply because of its notoriety, but because it finally
corrected the historical and legal errors in confession jurisprudence that
stem back through the due process era and all the way to Bram.
The first important accomplishment of the Miranda decision was that
it shifted the focus of confession law from due process back to its proper
home: the self-incrimination clause.0 2 The self-incrimination clause had
finally been made applicable to the states two years before Miranda; thus,
by the time Miranda was decided, the Court no longer needed to rely on its
strained due process experiment as it had for the previous three decades. 3
Second, the Court in Miranda seemingly abandoned the voluntariness
rubric and recognized that the correct test for confession admissibility in
the Bill of Rights is compulsion, as the text of the self-incrimination clause
dictates. 0 4 This important step not only made confession jurisprudence
consistent with the Bill of Rights, but it also seemingly overruled the
Court's legal error in Brain and in which the Court adopted the inapposite
common law evidentiary rule of voluntariness as the sine qua non of con-
fession admissibility.
Third, the Court in Miranda finally appeared to rid itself of the
reliability rationale.2 °5 This policy rationale had been present in constitu-
tional confession jurisprudence since Brain when it was engrafted into con-
fession law as a result of the Court's legal errors.0 6 The reliability rationale
then flourished during the due process era, as it coincided with the all-
encompassing, subjective voluntariness test that the Court constructed dur-
ing that time period.
given, is per se unconstitutional"); Ogletree, supra note 47, at 1827 ("Although Miranda warnings may
seem adequate from the detached perspective of a trial or appellate courtroom, in the harsh reality of a
police interrogation room they are woefully ineffective."); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 74
(1989) (arguing that warnings fail to overcome the inherently coercive effects of police custody);
Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern
Confessions Law, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 662, 671 (1986) (book review) ("If a simple response to a single
custodial question must be viewed as presumptively compelled, the possibility of having a voluntary
waiver is difficult to understand.").
202. Both Miranda and Malloy v. Hogan returned the focus to the self-incrimination clause.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58; Malloy, 378 U.S. 1, 5-14 (1964) (overtuming state commitment for
contempt where defendant was detained because he exercised Fifth Amendment rights and refused to
answer questions); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) ("[O]ur decisions in
Malloy... and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry in determining the admissibility" of
confessions from a due process inquiry to a focus on the self-incrimination clause); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442-44 (1974) (noting that Miranda refocused confession law on the self-
incrimination clause).
203. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463-64; see also Herman, supra note 23, at 733 n.5 (arguing that
Miranda made clear that the self-incrimination clause applied in the interrogation setting).
204. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
205. See Thomas & Bilder, supra note 3, at 277 ("[Miranda] rejected both the reliability of the
confession and due process fairness as tests of coercion.").
206. See supra notes 84-196 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Miranda decision correctly interpreted the self-
incrimination clause and the term "compulsion" as requiring an objective
test. The definition of "compulsion" in the Miranda decision examined
only the pressure placed on the suspect from an objective standpoint. The
Miranda Court specifically refused to consider whether the suspect in
question actually felt atmospheric pressure from the custodial interrogation
or even whether the suspect already was aware of his rights.2"7 In other
words, Miranda stands for the proposition that the government is prohib-
ited from using confessions obtained through compulsion in a general,
objective sense, regardless of the state of mind of the specific suspect
under interrogation in a given case.208
The curative benefits of Miranda were fleeting, as a newly con-
structed Court began turning back the clock to the due process era shortly
after Miranda was decided. The major flaw with the reasoning in Miranda,
which perhaps led to its downfall, is that it defined "compulsion" too
broadly. Miranda essentially held that the atmospheric pressure that exists
whenever an officer asks a question-any question-to a suspect in cus-
tody is compulsion in violation of the self-incrimination clause (unless the
officer dissipates the compulsion by giving the required warnings and ob-
taining a waiver). Under the Miranda paradigm, atmospheric pressure
alone equates with compulsion. The problem with this reasoning is not that
it evades the text. Indeed, the self-incrimination clause simply bans com-
pulsion and does not define the term. The Supreme Court is certainly
within its authority to define that term in any way it sees fit. The problem
with the Court's analysis is two-fold. First, Miranda's definition of the
term "compulsion" is at odds with how "compelled," as used in the self-
incrimination clause, has been defined outside of the interrogation context
in the formal setting cases. Second, the Miranda Court's definition of
"compulsion" is perhaps inconsistent with the historical origins of the self-
incrimination clause.
Miranda was consistent with the formal setting cases20 9 in one impor-
tant sense: both interpreted the term "compulsion" to require an objective
test focused primarily on the conduct of the government.2 ° Miranda, how-
ever, was inconsistent with the formal setting cases in its definition of
"compulsion." Miranda viewed compulsion as arising from the atmos-
pheric pressure inherent in custodial interrogation, while the formal setting
cases did not.21 ' Rather, the formal setting cases held that compulsion
207. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-64.
208. See id. at 460.
209. See supra Part IB.1; cf generally Schulhofer, supra note 134 (discussing Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
210. For a discussion of Miranda's inconsistency with the formal setting cases, see Godsey, supra
note 192, at 851, 901.
211. Seesupra Part 11.B.1.
[Vol. 93:465
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exists only when an objective penalty has been imposed by the government
on a suspect to provoke speech or punish silence.
21 2
Professor Stephen Schulhofer has asserted, in contrast, that Miranda's
definition of "compulsion" is consistent with how that same term has been
defined in the formal setting cases.2"3 Schulhofer argues, for example, that
the comments in Griffin v. California that the jury should consider the
defendant's failure to testify in determining guilt applied "impermissible
pressure" on the defendant to take the stand.214 Schulhofer then equates this
atmospheric pressure present in the courtroom in Griffin with the atmos-
pheric pressure that exists in the police station when an officer interrogates
a suspect who is in custody.215 The comments by the judge and prosecutor
in Griffin, however, violated the self-incrimination clause not simply be-
cause they applied atmospheric pressure to the defendant but because they
turned the defendant's silence into a concrete piece of evidence that the
jury was instructed that it may consider against him and, thus, directly in-
creased the chances of his conviction." 6 As the Griffin Court itself recog-
nized, atmospheric pressure was present from the outset of Griffin's trial
for him to provide his side of the story, as it is in all criminal trials.217 But
the penalties imposed by the prosecutor and the judge against Griffin went
beyond that inherent atmospheric pressure and changed the status quo in
favor of the government and against the defendant." 8 If one were hypo-
thetically keeping scores of the points each side had scored in their favor
during Griffin's trial, the comments by the prosecutor and judge placed an
addition point in the prosecution's tally, as it turned the atmospheric pres-
sure into an additional piece of evidence that strongly suggested the defen-
dant's guilt. As the Court recognized in Griffin, the comments solemnized
212. See id.
213. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 134.
214. Id. at 453.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
217. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). As anyone who has tried criminal cases can
verify, significant pressure is present in nearly every trial for the defendant to provide the jury with an
explanation as to why he or she is not guilty. This inherent pressure exists throughout the trial, from
opening statements through summations. For example, when a particularly damaging piece of evidence
is admitted against a defendant during the prosecution's case-in-chief, the members of the jury almost
invariably turn their heads in unison and stare at the defendant to see his or her reaction. Is he calm? Is
he squirming in his seat? Does he look ashamed or guilty? In some situations, it is clear to any observer
that the jurors are searching for an answer from the defendant himself. It seems unimaginable that
defendants would not feel this implicit demand from the jury. For more discussion of the atmospheric
pressure present during a typical criminal trial, see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272, 287-88 (1998) (describing the "undoubted pressures" that criminal defendants feel to testify at
their trials but stating that this atmospheric pressure does not constitute compulsion); infra notes 333-35
and accompanying text.
218. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
2005]
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 503 2005
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
that pressure into an actual, concrete penalty that could be objectively
identified.219
As will be discussed more in Part IV, when a police officer simply
asks a question of a suspect in custody, that act has not necessarily, by
itself, imposed an objective penalty on the suspect. This is because, given
the suspect's right not to answer, her situation has not concretely changed
to her detriment as compared to the moment before the question was asked.
If, however, the officer changes the status quo to provoke a confession by,
for example, depriving the suspect of food and water until she talks or tell-
ing her that her silence will be used against her at trial to obtain her convic-
tion, the officer has created and applied an objective penalty to provoke
speech and punish silence. As will be discussed more in Part IV, were the
doctrine developed in the formal setting cases to be applied to the interro-
gation context, a finding of compulsion would be required only when a
concrete and identifiable change in the suspect's situation had occurred that
could be objectively seen as penalizing the suspect for exercising his/her
constitutional right to silence.2
Miranda's broad definition of "compulsion," therefore, created a
strange dichotomy wherein the same term had two completely different
definitions depending on the context. In the informal setting, such as an
interrogation room at a police station, the compulsion standard is satisfied
by the mere presence of atmospheric pressure that derives from the custo-
dial setting. In formal settings, such as trials and congressional hearings,
however, compulsion is not found to exist in relation to the same sort of
atmospheric pressure but only when an objective penalty is imposed on the
suspect to provoke speech or punish silence. It simply does not make
sense, however, to have two completely different definitions of the same
term unless some policy exists that can justify this divergence.22" ' No
justification has been offered, however, as the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue. The Court in Miranda set forth its definition
of "compulsion" without acknowledging the existence of a contradictory
line of cases that defines the same term in the same provision in the Bill of
219. Id.
220. See supra Part II.B.1; infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
221. One might argue that a broader interpretation of the term compulsion is needed in the
interrogation setting because in the formal setting the presence of defense counsel and the trappings of
the courtroom automatically work to decrease the pressure inherent in that setting. In other words,
atmospheric pressure should amount to compulsion in the interrogation setting because it may not be
clear to a suspect under interrogation that the Constitution has followed her into the interrogation room.
However, as this Article demonstrates, criminal defendants in the formal setting often experience
severe atmospheric pressure to speak, which does not violate the self-incrimination clause absent a
penalty imposed. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text, and infra notes 332-35 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, post-Miranda confession jurisprudence allows penalties to be
imposed on suspects under interrogation without rendering the resulting confessions involuntary. See
Part IV.I.A. Thus, importing a penalties analysis to the interrogation context, as this Article proffers,
would harmonize the concept of compulsion in the formal and interrogation settings.
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cases that defines the same term in the same provision in the Bill of Rights
in a different manner.
Furthermore, the objective penalties test associated with the formal
setting cases offers a definition of compulsion that is more consistent with
the historical underpinnings of the self-incrimination clause than the broad
definition delineated in Miranda. As set forth in detail supra, the Framers
adopted the self-incrimination clause to ban certain penalties, such as
physical punishments, deprivations of liberty, and divine retribution via the
oath ex officio, used by ecclesiastical tribunals.222 The historical data, while
not abundant and far from clear, does not seem to support the notion that
the Framers were concerned with the kind of unstated, intangible atmos-
pheric pressure described in Miranda.223
B. Post-Miranda: The Court's Return to the Due Process
Voluntariness Test
The year after Miranda was decided, the Court faced its next confes-
sion case, Beecher v. Alabama.224 In Beecher, a majority of the Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the confession used
against him at trial had been made involuntarily under the pre-Miranda,
due process involuntary confession rule.225 Four justices who concurred in
the result wondered why the majority of the Court had returned to due
process after that doctrine had seemingly been made obsolete by the
Miranda decision.226 Justice Brennan noted in his concurring opinion that
although the confession in Beecher had been obtained prior to the release
of the Miranda decision, it nonetheless had been obtained after the Court in
Malloy v. Hogan held that the self-incrimination clause was applicable to
the states in 1964.22 Justice Brennan argued, therefore, that the Court
should have asked whether Beecher's confession had been compelled in
violation of the self-incrimination clause, rather than whether it had been
made involuntarily under the due process standard.228 Justice Brennan as-
serted that the test for compulsion applied in Beecher should have been the
pre-Miranda, strict, objective standard set forth in Bram, rather than the
more flexible, subjective, and police-friendly due process involuntary con-
fession rule.229
222. See discussion of Nemo tenetur supra Part I.B. 1.
223. See id.
224. 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
225. Id. at 38.
226. Id. at 38-39.
227. Id. at 39. See Malloy v. Hogan, 379 U.S. 1 (1964).
228. Id.
229. Id. (arguing that because the Court in Malloy, which had been decided prior to the
interrogation in Beecher, had adopted the Bram standard for compulsion, the Brain standard should
apply in this case).
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The Court's return to the due process involuntary confession rule in
Beecher was a harbinger of the Court's future course. Over the next three
decades, the Court gradually undermined the doctrinal advances that
Miranda had made and reasserted the due-process-based voluntariness test
as the underlying focal point of constitutional confession law. This trend is
most evident in the line of cases that has come to be known as the
"Miranda-exception cases," which, contrary to Miranda's core holding,
established that custodial interrogation, by itself, does not amount to com-
pulsion in violation of the self-incrimination clause."'
In its 1984 decision in New York v. Quarles, for example, the Court
created the "public-safety" exception to the Miranda warnings require-
ment. This exception applies when police officers have a pressing interest
in interrogating a suspect to divert a potentially imminent danger to the
public or themselves." 1 In crafting this exception, the Quarles Court held,
contrary to one of the central tenets of Miranda, that the act of custodial
interrogation does not equate with impermissible compulsion.2 Indeed,
Quarles was interrogated while in police custody and without the protec-
tion of Miranda warnings, but the Court held that no constitutional viola-
tion occurred because there had been no compulsion. 3 The Quarles
holding, therefore, relaxed the Miranda Court's definition of
"compulsion," because it suggested some undefined amount of pressure
beyond the intangible, atmospheric pressure inherent in custodial interroga-
tion must be present to constitute compulsion.
Despite this overruling of Miranda's core holding, Quarles and the
other Miranda-exception cases234 retained the basic warning/waiver
230. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (viewing Miranda warnings as a bright-
line prophylactic rule, designed to protect the self-incrimination clause, that "sweeps more broadly than
the [self-incrimination clause] itself."); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a "public-
safety" exception to the Miranda warnings requirement); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
(ruling that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply with full force to Miranda
violations); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that a statement taken from a defendant
during custodial interrogation where no Miranda warnings had been given may be used for
impeachment purposes at trial). See generally David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda
Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805 (1992). The Court's holding in Dickerson v. United States
that the Miranda warnings have a constitutional basis does not change this analysis. 530 U.S. 428, 439
n.3 (2000). See Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier-The International Arena: A Critical
Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposalfor a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1703, 1742-52 (2002) (discussing Dickerson and its implicit adoption of the theory that rules of
criminal procedure can be both prophylactic and constitutional at the same time); see also United States
v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (discussing Miranda's role as a judge-made prophylactic rule that has
a constitutional basis).
231. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654-58.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 655.
234. See supra note 230. See generally Wollin, supra note 230 (discussing the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine). The Court's holdings in both Harris and Tucker were based on the same
principle as Quarles-that custodial interrogation, by itself, does not amount to compulsion in violation
of the self-incrimination clause. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45; Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
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procedure as the initial litmus-test step in determining the admissibility of a
confession in most situations. 35 But, in undermining the Miranda Court's
broad definition of the term "compelled," these cases have separated the
warnings from the self-incrimination clause and the concept of compulsion
itself. Indeed, the Miranda-exception cases made clear that because the
atmospheric pressure inherent in custodial interrogation is no longer seen
as sufficient to constitute compulsion, the warnings are no longer required
to prevent a confession from being deemed compelled per se when custo-
dial interrogation is employed. Instead, the warnings are seen as a bright-
line prophylactic rule, similar to a common law rule of evidence, which
offers practical reinforcement to the self-incrimination clause by creating
an easily administered presumption to determine when a confession is
admissible in most scenarios.236  After the emergence of the
Miranda-exception cases, when a confession is held inadmissible due to
the failure to provide Miranda warnings, it is not because the lack of warn-
ings renders the confession compelled in violation of the self-incrimination
clause. Rather, it is inadmissible because the judicially created prophylactic
rule has been violated. Seen in this light, the Court in the
Miranda-exception cases carved out exceptions only to a judicially created
rule, to which the Court is free to create exceptions as it sees fit, not to an
actual constitutional right.23 7
The important point for purposes of this Article is the new test for
admissibility that the Court set forth in the Miranda-exception cases. After
Quarles, when is a confession considered compelled? The benchmark set
by Miranda at custodial interrogation has been eviscerated in favor of
greater police latitude, but what level of pressure is now required for a
finding of compulsion under the self-incrimination clause? Inexplicably,
the Supreme Court has not provided a clear answer.238 Rather, the Court
has avoided the issue by suggesting that where the Miranda doctrine is in-
applicable, the default test is not compulsion under the self-incrimination
clause but voluntariness under the old due process involuntary confession
rule. 239
235. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653-58; Harris, 401 U.S. at 224-25.
236. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444. The Court's holding in Dickerson v. United States, that the Miranda
warnings have a "constitutional basis," 530 U.S. 428, 439 n.3 (2000), does not change this analysis. See
Godsey, supra note 230, at 1742-52; see also United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626, 2628-29
(2004) (discussing Miranda's role as judge-made prophylactic rule that has a constitutional basis).
237. See supra notes 230, 235; see also M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons From the Lindh Case: Public
Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 268-81 (2002) (discussing post-Dickerson
cases and suggesting that Miranda remains a flexible, prophylactic rule after Dickerson).
238. See Benner, supra note 4, at 150-52 (arguing that the definition of "compulsion" in the
Miranda decision has been undermined by the Court's subsequent cases, which have not provided a
replacement); Klein, supra note 14, at 1073-74 (noting that the Supreme Court has never provided a
clear definition of "compulsion").
239. See, e.g., Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624 (holding that the evidentiary fruits of a Miranda
violation are admissible so long as the statement that led to the evidence was made voluntarily); New
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What we are left with at the foundation of confession law is a return to
the basic rule of decades past that involuntary confessions are inadmissible
under notions of due process. The Miranda warnings are still required in
most situations but only as a prophylactic rule designed to make easier the
Court's task of determining the voluntariness of a confession. Thus, rather
than an objective test for compulsion based on the self-incrimination
clause, as the Miranda decision promised, the underlying touchstone for
confession admissibility is, once again, voluntariness. Miranda warnings
provide an objective first-step litmus test for determining voluntariness,
which is arguably an improvement over the time when the voluntariness
test alone determined admissibility.140 However, the voluntariness test con-
tinues to serve as the rule in cases where Miranda warnings are not re-
quired; as the doctrine underlying and justifying the Miranda warnings
themselves; and, more importantly, as the only check on police conduct in
the high percentage of interrogations where Miranda warnings have been
provided and waived.2 41 It is not clear why the Court returned to the due
process involuntary confession rule after the Miranda decision seemingly
made that rule obsolete. 42 Some scholars have speculated that the involun-
tary confession rule resurfaced because some members of the Court were
hostile to Miranda and planned eventually to overturn it, returning the fo-
cus of confession law back to the more police-friendly due process test.243
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (holding that statements taken under public-safety
Miranda exception are admissible so long as they were voluntarily made under notions of due process);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda
may be used for impeachment purposes if made voluntarily); see also Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 873
(noting that the due process involuntary confession rule "remains the principal basis for adjudication in
various confession situations not governed by Miranda").
240. The word "arguably" is used because, as set forth infra at notes 266-68, 325 and
accompanying text, the ultimate impact of Miranda is that when the typical suspect waives her rights,
courts presume the resulting confession is voluntary and provide very little oversight to the type of
police tactics used during the ensuing post-Miranda interrogation. In many ways, therefore, the
Miranda warnings requirement, as currently implemented, lessens court scrutiny on policy
interrogation tactics. The objective penalties proposed in Part IV.B allow for more thorough scrutiny of
interrogation practices after the Miranda warnings have been read and waived.
241. The problematic fact that the voluntariness test is the sole test that applies to interrogations
after Miranda warnings have been provided and waived is worsened by the fact that after warning and
waiver, courts presume all confessions to have been voluntarily made. See Welsh S. White, Miranda's
Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1211, 1217-21 (2001)
(discussing fact that voluntariness test applies after Miranda warnings have been provided and waived,
and that courts provide little oversight to police conduct after waiver, resulting in a diluted
voluntariness standard post-waiver). See infra notes 266-68, 325 and accompanying text; supra note
240 and accompanying text.
242. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 877-78 (noting that some assumed that the due process
involuntary confession rule would be "buried" after Miranda).
243. See Herman, Part I, supra note 65, at 103 (noting that several members of the Court
disfavored Miranda a few years after the decision was published and probably wished to return to the
less restrictive due process standard); Herman, Part I1, supra note 122, at 521, 527, 531 (same);
Herman, supra note 23, at 737-39 (noting that, due to changes in composition, a majority of the Court
was generally hostile to the Miranda decision by 1972); see also George C. Thomas Il, Miranda's
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Indeed, the Miranda decision created a firestorm and was highly criticized
by politicians, media, and Justices alike as a rule that coddled criminals
and was apt to let the guilty go free.2" It was no secret that many of the
Justices who joined the Court post-Miranda did not look favorably at that
decision. 45 Retaining the involuntary confession rule and repositioning it
as the underlying rule that the Miranda warnings were designed to protect
would make the eventual overruling of Miranda that much easier. Indeed,
by recasting Miranda as a judicially created prophylactic rule rather than a
constitutional mandate, the Court was gradually freeing itself to dispose of
the warnings altogether. This move would leave the involuntary confession
rule-now considered to underlie the Miranda warnings-as the sole rule
remaining when this transition occurred.
The self-incrimination clause's ban on compelled confessions remains
applicable to interrogations, but the Court has not clearly defined its mean-
ing. As a result, many have undoubtedly assumed that the test under the
self-incrimination clause is now identical to the due process involuntary
confession rule and that both doctrines overlap and simultaneously prohibit
the admission of involuntary confessions. Dicta and "loose language '246 in
several Supreme Court opinions may support this assumption.2 47 However,
the text, history, and interpretations of term "compelled" in non-
interrogation contexts demand an objective test based not on voluntariness
but rather on compulsion and the imposition of objective penalties. Dicta,
"loose language," and the Court's refusal to directly address the issue
should not override these controlling principles.
Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2003) (book
review). Former law professor and current United States District Judge Paul G. Cassell is the leading
critic of Miranda. For years, Cassell has put forth arguments to support the Court's hostility to
Miranda. To sample Cassell's work in this respect, see generally Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken:
The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 898 (2001); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute
that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REv. 175 (1999);
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the
Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions--and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998).
244. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 243-48 (1983) (discussing negative
reaction of politicians and public to Miranda); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 158
(1970) (same).
245. See supra note 243.
246. See Schulhofer, supra note 134, at 440.
247. The Court most recently used "loose language," as Professor Schulhofer calls it, Schulhofer,
supra note 246, at 440, regarding the terms "compelled" and "involuntary" in the 2004 case of United
States v. Patane. 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2624-30 (2004) (using "compelled" and "involuntary"
interchangeably without directly addressing whether a distinction exists between the two terms). See
also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (describing test for compulsion under the
self-incrimination clause by using language associated with the due process voluntary confession
rule).
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It is apparent that the true meaning of the self-incrimination clause
(and its role in interrogations) became lost in the shuffle during the Court's
struggles over Miranda. The unnecessary breadth with which the Miranda
decision defined the term "compulsion" was perhaps its own undoing. It
caused such hostility that the Court rejected the doctrinal underpinnings of
the decision without recognizing that perhaps some aspects of Miranda
might have been worth saving. Indeed, Miranda's rejection of the involun-
tary confession rule, and its creation of an objective test for compulsion,
were steps in the right direction and marked the foundation for continued
improvement in the area. The Court post-Miranda should have reined in its
definition of compulsion to bring it more in line with the history, text, and
interpretation of the self-incrimination clause in the formal setting cases,
rather than reject almost the entire decision and nearly everything associ-
ated with it. The objective penalties test proposed herein and developed in
detail in Part IV retains the meritorious aspects of Miranda and represents
a middle ground that is truer to the meaning of the self-incrimination
clause than the Miranda decision but avoids many of the problems deline-
ated herein with the due process involuntary confession rule.
C. Dickerson v. United States: The Battle over Miranda Concludes
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501.245 This statute was intended to overrule the requirement that offi-
cers give Miranda warnings to suspects by once again making voluntari-
ness, rather than the recitation of warnings, the touchstone for the
admissibility of confessions.249 Section 3501 set forth a nonexclusive list of
factors, including whether the suspect was advised of his constitutional
rights, that courts could consider in determining voluntariness.25 ° Although
248. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
249. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436 (2000) ("[W]e agree with the Court of
Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda.").
250. § 3501:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a
confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of
the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines
that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge
shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct
the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the
circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all
the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required
to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
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this statute was enacted in 1968, it was largely ignored by federal prosecu-
tors. Thus, the Miranda warnings requirement remained intact simply by
default.2
1
In Dickerson, however, the long-awaited confrontation between
Miranda and § 3501 finally emerged. The Supreme Court in Dickerson
noted that it may use its supervisory authority over the federal courts to
prescribe "rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribu-
nals. ''252 The power to judicially create such nonconstitutional rules, how-
ever, "exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress. 253
Congress retains "the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judi-
cially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the
Constitution. '254 On the other hand, when the Supreme Court establishes a
rule that interprets or applies the Constitution, Congress may not legisla-
tively supersede such a decision. 2"5 The question in Dickerson, therefore,
was "whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
congressional direction." '256 If the Miranda warnings were required by the
Constitution, they could not be overruled by statute and § 3501 was uncon-
stitutional; if the Miranda warnings requirement was merely a judicially
created rule of evidence or procedure, Congress had the authority to over-
rule that decision by enacting § 3501.
The Court ultimately held in Dickerson that § 3501 could not be en-
forced because the warnings component of the Miranda decision was in
fact intended to be a constitutional ruling. 7 In contrast, the court of ap-
peals had held that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required
because the Supreme Court has not always required them when circum-
stances have rendered their application impractical, such as in the
Miranda-exception cases."' The court of appeals apparently believed that
Supreme Court decisions that create prophylactic rules are
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration
by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
251. See Brooke B. Grona, Casenote, United States v. Dickerson: Leaving Miranda and Finding a
Deserted Statute, 26 Am. J. CliM. L. 367 (1999) (discussing the fact that § 3501 had never been
invoked by prosecutors prior to Dickerson); see also United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th
Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (raising the issue of § 3501's application and stating that "the
Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law simply by
refusing to argue it").
252. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437. For further discussion of Dickerson, see Godsey, supra note 230,
at 1742-52.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 431-32, 435.
258. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999).
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nonconstitutional in the sense that they are similar to common law rules of
evidence that may be modified or overruled by an Act of Congress. Only
decisions that hand down constitutional mandates are within the Court's
authority to interpret the Constitution, and only these decisions are immune
to being overruled by Congress. Citing Miranda-exception cases such as
New York v. Quarles259 and Harris v. New York, 6° the Supreme Court re-
sponded in Dickerson:
These decisions illustrate the principle-not that Miranda is not a
constitutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is immutable.
No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the
various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and
the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a
normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.26
Many scholars have argued that the Dickerson decision does not make
sense.262 If the Miranda warnings are constitutionally required, then the
Court is not free to make exceptions to them in cases such as Quarles.263
Yet, the Court explicitly reaffirmed Quarles and the other
Miranda-exception cases in Dickerson, without a satisfactory explanation
as to how it reconciled these competing doctrines. Given the Court's strong
language in many of the Miranda-exception cases and the widespread be-
lief that a majority of the Justices had, prior to Dickerson, hoped to over-
rule the Miranda warnings, it may have surprised many that the Court
ultimately decided to retain the warnings. While trying to interpret the mo-
tives of the Court is like reading tea leaves, it is quite possible that certain
key Justices ultimately decided to retain the warnings simply because of
the strong support for the warnings that became apparent during the
Dickerson litigation. Indeed, in a nearly unprecedented move, the
Department of Justice filed its brief in support of its opponent in the case,
Mr. Dickerson, and urged the Court not to overrule the warnings require-
ment.2" It seemed that the majority of individuals or entities involved
259. 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
260. 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing the prosecution to impeach a testifying defendant with a prior
inconsistent statement taken from him during a pretrial police interrogation without Miranda
warnings); see supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
261. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
262. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson,
Miranda and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 35 (2001)
(stating that Dickerson was "regarded by virtually every informed observer as inconsistent and
unprincipled"); Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority and
Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 387, 394 (2001) (stating that the Dickerson
decision is not plausible); Klein, supra note 14, at 1071 (concluding that Dickerson is contradictory and
incoherent).
263. See supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
264. See Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001) (discussing the fact that the Department of Justice supported Mr.
Dickerson's position and argued that the Miranda warnings requirement should be retained).
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preferred the clarity of Miranda over the vague and highly subjective in-
voluntary confession rule, which would be the controlling test in all situa-
tions, were the Miranda warnings to be removed. 65
The Dickerson Court may also have been persuaded to retain the
Miranda warnings requirement because the requirement seemed to favor
the police more than the Miranda Court might have originally
anticipated. 26 6 After Miranda warnings have been provided to a suspect and
waived, most courts simply presume that any confession that follows was
made voluntarily. 267 As a result, courts post-Miranda have provided very
little oversight to what goes on during interrogations after the recitation
and waiver of Miranda warnings, and interrogators have been able to apply
quite a bit of pressure to suspects without running afoul of the
Constitution.26 8
It is important to note that the Court in Dickerson, while reaffirming
the warnings component of Miranda, did not undo the detachment of the
warnings from the self-incrimination clause and the concept of compulsion
that occurred in the Miranda-exception cases described supra. The
Dickerson Court essentially reaffirmed the previous four decades of
Miranda jurisprudence, including the relaxation of the Miranda decision's
compulsion definition that occurred post-Miranda. The Dickerson Court
reinforced the post-Quarles status quo, holding that custodial interrogation
does not equate with compulsion and that the Miranda warnings are a con-
stitutionally-based prophylactic rule. More importantly, the Court held that
the underlying doctrine that the warnings are designed to protect is the due
process involuntary confession rule rather than the broad, objective concept
of compulsion that the Miranda Court originally set forth.
Whatever the Court's motivations for retaining the warnings, it ap-
pears that the warnings required by Miranda are here to stay, at least for
the foreseeable future. Now that any desires by some of the Justices to
265. See George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.
L. & HUMAN. 79, 102 n.86 (1993) (discussing the fact that the police eventually abandoned complaints
about Miranda); Thomas, supra note 243, at 1092, 1096 (same).
266. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 497 n.9 (2002) (citing a number of scholars in
support of the proposition that "[i]t is now widely recognized that when the police follow Miranda's
procedural instructions by administering the warnings and obtaining a waiver, Miranda serves as a
license, rather than an impediment, to secure usable confessions").
267. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) ("[C]ases in which a defendant can
make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the
law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare."); William J. Stuntz, Miranda's
Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (noting that courts may tolerate more coercion because the
burden is on defendants who have waived their rights to show they did not understand the warnings);
White, supra note 241, at 1220 ("A finding that the police have properly informed the suspect of his
Miranda rights ... often has the effect of minimizing or eli4inating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver
interrogation practices.").
268. See Herman, supra note 23, at 752-54 (providing case examples).
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relinquish the warnings requirement and return completely to the due proc-
ess involuntary confession rule have been vanquished, the time is ripe for
the Court to put away its political disputes of the past and clean up the
mess it has made in the arena of constitutional confession law over the past
century.
If the Court does so, it should start with a clean slate. The Court
should recognize that the much-maligned voluntariness test still survives
after Dickerson, and indeed, it continues to serve as the foundation of con-
fession law. The voluntariness test remains the test in all cases where
Miranda does not apply; it remains the test during interrogations after the
Miranda warnings have been provided and waived; and it serves as the
doctrine underlying and justifying the Miranda warnings themselves.
Indeed, the Court currently requires the Miranda warnings to help deter-
mine the voluntariness of a confession in the due process sense of the term,
rather than whether the police conduct, namely the custodial interrogation,
constituted compulsion as the self-incrimination clause dictates.269 The
Court should consider the fact that the involuntary confession rule is not
required by the Bill of Rights and that it initially emerged as a result of
legal and historical mistakes made by the Court in BramY' The Court
should then consider the tortured history of the involuntary confession rule
in the mid-twentieth century that led to its widespread condemnation and
the Court's ultimate search to replace it, culminating in the Miranda deci-
sion.27' The Court should consider the fact that the voluntariness standard
reappeared after Miranda primarily as a result of a backlash against the
Miranda warnings requirement; a backlash that may have been justified in
some respects, but that has gone too far. The Court should consider the fact
that the involuntary confession rule is so unworkable and disfavored that
even law enforcement agencies in the Dickerson litigation supported the
retention of the Miranda warnings rather than return completely to the due
process involuntary confession rule, as applied prior to the Miranda deci-
sion.272 The Court should ask itself why it continues to focus on voluntari-
ness as the touchstone for confession admissibility and as the doctrine
underlying the Miranda warnings.
As Professor Yale Kamisar so aptly noted:
The real reasons for excluding confessions have too long been
obscured by traditional language. The time has come to unmask
them and to build from there. It is fatuous, to be sure, to suppose
269. Although the Court sometimes uses the terms "involuntary" and "compelled"
interchangeably, see supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text, the test that the Court applies for both
is the due-process based voluntariness test rather than compulsion in an objective sense as required by
Miranda and as suggested in this Article.
270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
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that there will ever be a vocabulary free of all ambiguity .... But
there are some words which, owing to their history, needlessly
obstruct clear thinking, and "voluntary," "involuntary" et aL, are
surely among them. The due process confession cases have too
often been characterized by Indians-attacking-the-covered-wagon
tactics, i.e., circling around and around the problem and taking pot
shots at it. The time has come for a more direct approach." 3
Professor Kamisar made this statement in 1963.74 More than forty years
later, the Court, after several detours, has come full circle and in many
respects has moved back to the position it held in 1963. Part IV addresses
where the Court should go from here.
IV
CREATION OF A WORKABLE OBJECTIVE PENALTIES TEST BASED ON THE
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
The cumulative lessons derived from the historical journey in Parts I
through III can be summarized as follows. First, confession law should be
regulated primarily by the self-incrimination clause rather than by the due
process clauses. Second, the touchstone for confession admissibility under
the self-incrimination clause should be compulsion rather than voluntari-
ness. Third, existing Supreme Court precedent suggests an objective stan-
dard that focuses on government conduct rather than the suspect's state of
mind when determining the existence of compulsion. Fourth, compulsion
exists under the self-incrimination clause when the government
imposes a penalty on a suspect to either punish silence or provoke speech.
The Supreme Court applies this standard in the formal setting cases.
Furthermore, this objective penalties standard is not inconsistent with the
Court's incomplete and ambiguous interpretations of compulsion in the
interrogation setting.275 Fifth, an objective penalties test for compulsion in
the interrogation context is more consistent with both the text and the his-
torical origins of the self-incrimination clause. 27 6
These lessons suggest that the Court should develop and implement
an objective penalties test to regulate the admissibility of confessions. This
273. See Kamisar, supra note 11, at 759 (internal quotations omitted).
274. See id.
275. Indeed, current interpretations of compulsion in the interrogation context require something
more than atmospheric pressure. See discussion of Quarles supra Part III.B. Miranda's broad
interpretation has been repudiated by the Miranda-exception cases, and the current state of the law
requires that "something more" than atmospheric pressure be present during an interrogation to render
it compelled. See id. The Court has not defined what "something more" means, other than to suggest
that compulsion now equates with voluntariness, and thus, pressure must be applied sufficient to
overbear the suspect's will. Thus, the objective penalties would correctly distinguish the concepts of
compulsion and voluntariness, and would require "something more" than atmospheric pressure in that it
would require a penalty to be imposed before a finding of compulsion can be made.
276. See id.
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test would suppress a confession if the police impose a penalty on a suspect
during an interrogation to punish silence or provoke speech because such a
penalty would constitute compulsion in violation of the self-incrimination
clause if the confession is later admitted into evidence against the suspect.
This concept is not entirely without precedent. The 1967 decision of
Garrity v. New Jersey2. is perhaps the one existing bridge that arguably
links the objective penalties test from the formal setting cases with the in-
terrogation context. In Garrity, several police officers were convicted of
participating in a traffic ticket-fixing scheme.278 At their trials, the govern-
ment introduced confessions that the officers had previously made at an
inquiry held by the Attorney General of New Jersey.279 The officers had
confessed at the inquiry only after being warned that they would lose their
jobs if they invoked their right to remain silent. 8° In reversing the convic-
tions and holding the officers' confessions inadmissible, the majority of the
Court seemingly relied on two distinct grounds: the due process involun-
tary confession rule and the objective penalties test from the formal setting
cases.28" ' Regarding the objective penalties test, the Court stated:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or
to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of
livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That
practice, like the interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v.
Arizona, [is impermissible].28
The Court went on to note that the self-incrimination clause provides
suspects with a right to remain silent, a right "of constitutional stature
whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price." '283
This application of the objective penalties test in the interrogation
context did not escape the notice of Justice Harlan. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Harlan observed:
The majority is apparently engaged in the delicate task of
riding two unruly horses at once: it is presumably arguing
simultaneously that the statements were involuntary as a matter of
fact, in the same fashion that the statements in [due process
voluntary confession rule cases] were thought to be involuntary,
and that the statements were inadmissible as a matter of law, on the
premise that they were products of an impermissible condition
277. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
278. Id. at 494.
279. Id. at 494-95.
280. Id. at 494.
281. Id. at 496-500.
282. Id. at 497, 500.
283. Id. at 500.
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imposed on the constitutional privilege. These are very different
contentions and require different replies.284
Ultimately, Harlan did not disagree with the majority's position that both
doctrines applied to the case.285 Harlan merely repeated his view, which he
stated in his dissenting opinion in another formal setting case, Spevack v.
Klein,286 that the self-incrimination clause should not prohibit the imposi-
tion of penalties or conditions that "serve important public interests." '287
The Garrity decision raises the following paramount question: If
threatening a suspect with termination violates the self-incrimination
clause and renders a confession inadmissible as a matter of law when the
threat occurs in a formal inquiry, why would this same sort of threat not
render a confession inadmissible as a matter of law when it occurs in the
stationhouse interrogation room? For example, an interrogating officer
might threaten to make a behind-the-scenes effort to get a suspect fired
from his private sector job if the suspect does not confess to a crime. Under
existing law, such a threat would render the resulting confession inadmis-
sible only if the court found that the threat overbore the will of the suspect
and elicited an involuntary confession. But many courts might hold such a
confession voluntary and admissible on the theory that an innocent man
would rather lose his job than confess to a crime. Why would such a threat
in a police interrogation room not also constitute an impermissible penalty
on the exercise of a constitutional right and render the confession inadmis-
sible as a matter of law? There is no satisfactory distinction between the
two scenarios. The objective penalties test should be applied in the latter
scenario as well.
Section A below defines the scope of what constitutes a penalty under
this objective penalties test. Section B addresses whether an interrogation
constitutes an objective penalty. This Section also suggests that Miranda
warnings can play an important role in the objective penalties test. Section
C distinguishes threats from offers and explains why only threats should be
considered objective penalties. Section D focuses on how the objective
penalties test would treat psychological pressure employed by the police in
an interrogation room. Finally, Section E addresses the remaining role the
due process clauses may play in supplementing the objective penalties test.
This Section asserts that the objective penalties test could be supplemented
by due process considerations in two ways.
284. Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 510.
286. 385 U.S. 511, 521-29 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
287. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 509.
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A. Objective Penalty Defined
Defining the concept of an objective penalty is not an easy task. First,
the Court must define what penalty in the interrogation context is. Should
every possible penalty imposed by an interrogator render a confession in-
admissible, or should the Court specify which penalties are impermissible?
Supreme Court precedent, indications of the Framers' original intent and
public policy considerations inform the answer to this question provided
below. Second, the Court must apply an objective standard to determine
what constitutes a penalty. What set of facts objectively indicate a penalty?
A rich pool of philosophical scholarship regarding improper coercion sug-
gests that a court should base this determination on the baseline of the par-
ties at the time and place of the interrogation.
1. Scope of the Objective Penalties Test: The "Laundry List" Approach
vs. the "All-Inclusive" Approach
The Court could define the scope of what constitutes an objective
penalty by creating a list of interrogation techniques that it believes consti-
tute impermissible penalties. Interrogation techniques such as the use of
physical violence, sleep or food deprivation, or any other method that
offends the Court's sense of justice could be added to the list on a case-by-
case basis. Various scholars have mentioned the possibility of this "laundry
list" method of regulating confessions.288 In fact, this method seems to be
the most consistent with the Framer's original intent.289
Existing interpretations of the word "compelled" in the formal setting
cases and sound public policy concerns, however, support a much broader
"all-inclusive" approach. The formal setting cases instruct that the imposi-
tion of any and all penalties imposed to provoke speech or punish silence
violate the self-incrimination clause.29° In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court
stated that the self-incrimination clause protects the accused's "free choice
to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."29' In accordance with this princi-
ple, the Court in Malloy noted that it had, in the past, "held
inadmissible. .. a confession secured by so mild a whip as the
refusal... to allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed." '292 The
Court considers this result to be consistent with the self-incrimination
288. See also infra note 306. See generally Alschuler, supra note 68, at 2668; Klein, supra note
14, Allen and Mace, supra note 141, at 251-56 (arguing that the voluntariness test is in effect already
an objective test for compulsion as implemented by the Supreme Court, and that the Court, in effect,
has adopted a laundry list approach based on acceptable social conventions).
289. See discussion of Nemo tenetur supra Part I.B. 1; see also Alschuler, supra note 68, at 2638-
60.
290. See supra Part lI.B.1; supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 291-
306 and accompanying text.
291. 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
292. Id.
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clause's guarantee of "the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty... for such silence. 293
The next year, in Spevack v. Klein, the Court further elaborated that
such a "penalty"
is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in
Griffin v. California, the imposition of any sanction which makes
the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege "costly.". . . . "It
may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon." '294
Two noted scholars, Stephen Schulhofer and the late Joseph Grano, dis-
cussed the issue of whether the formal setting cases interpret the term
"penalty" using a limiting laundry list approach or a more liberal, all-
inclusive approach in a pair of articles. Schulhofer, a well-known Miranda
supporter, argued that the formal setting cases support the theoretical
underpinning of the Miranda decision that the atmospheric pressure inher-
ent in custodial interrogation constitutes compulsion.2 95 Grano, a reputed
Miranda critic, disagreed with this assertion and identified several flaws in
Schulhofer's reasoning.' 9' Importantly, though, both scholars agreed that
the formal setting cases correctly adopt the broad "all-inclusive" definition
of "penalty." '297 Grano agreed with Schulhofer that the government's impo-
sition of even a small penalty on a defendant who refuses to testify in the
formal setting violates the self-incrimination clause because it makes a
"claim of right" to the defendant's testimony.2 98 Thus, Grano would, for
example, agree that if the state of New Jersey in Garrity threatened the of-
ficers that they would each be fined a nominal sum, the resulting confes-
sions should still have been deemed inadmissible.
Grano supports his broad interpretation of the term "penalty" under a
"claim of right" theory by making an analogy to the Fourth Amendment
293. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
294. 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
295. Schulhofer, supra note 134, at 439-46.
296. Grano, supra note 30, at 182-86.
297. See id. at 183; Schulhofer, supra note 134, at 443.
298. Grano, supra note 30, at 183; see Sehulhofer, supra note 134, at 443.
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consent to search cases. Grano notes that when an officer applies mild
pressure to a suspect to convince him to consent to a search of his automo-
bile, for example, the mild pressure typically will not render the resulting
consent invalid.2 99 When an officer makes a claim of right to search an
automobile by stating or suggesting that he has the authority to search,
however, the resulting consent is always held invalid per se even if the
pressure exerted by the officer is slight or nonexistent."3 Likewise, because
fining the Griffin defendants three dollars for refusing to testify would have
constituted a similar claim of right to their testimony-in effect suggesting
to them that the state has the right to their statements without providing
immunity and will take steps to get those statements-that too would vio-
late the self-incrimination clause per se.
Grano's concession on this point bolsters this Article's contention that
the formal setting cases support an objective penalties test in the interroga-
tion context. While Grano perhaps believed that he punched some holes in
Schulhofer's thesis that the formal setting cases are consistent with
Miranda's "atmospheric pressure" test, Schulhofer's claim was the only
theory that Grano was attempting to refute. Grano's arguments, however,
do not undermine the thesis of this Article that the formal setting cases
support an objective penalties test in the interrogation context. If threaten-
ing a defendant that he will lose his job if he does not testify at trial consti-
tutes compulsion in violation of the self-incrimination clause, which Grano
concedes, then why would the imposition of a similar penalty in an interro-
gation room not constitute impermissible compulsion?" 1 In Grano's world,
the former would be unconstitutional per se because it occurs in a court-
room, while the latter would be unconstitutional only if it rendered the
resulting confession involuntary under the due process involuntary confes-
sion rule. Likewise, if threatening to fine a defendant three dollars if she
does not testify at trial constitutes a penalty and compulsion because it
makes a claim of right to the defendant's testimony, why would an offi-
cer's act of taking away a suspect's three dollar pack of cigarettes until she
confesses not constitute a claim of right and, thus, a penalty and compul-
sion as well, regardless of whether this act overbore her will?3"2
299. Grano, supra note 30, at 183-84.
300. Id.
301. Assuming, of course, that the suspect confesses after the penalty is imposed and the
confession is used against her at trial.
302. Assuming the suspect is otherwise not prohibited from smoking in the place where the
interrogation is held. See infra note 308 and accompanying text. This discussion, of course, also
assumes that the issue of compulsion arises when the prosecution seeks to admit her confession into
evidence against her at trial. See generally Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (holding that the
self-incrimination clause is implicated only when the government seeks to admit a confession against
the defendant at trial). Under Chavez, whether compulsion existed during an interrogation is
determined retrospectively when the government seeks to introduce the resulting confession into
evidence, and thus, under the objective penalties test, the government could not introduce a confession
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If Grano were alive today, he might have responded by asserting that
the three dollar fine constitutes a claim of right and, thus, a penalty because
it is a formal act of the state, authorized by statute, regulation or court
order. This formality informs the defendant that the state is serious and that
it intends to follow through with proper legal process to enforce the
penalty. The fine signals to defendants that they do not have a true right to
remain silent. If a true right to remain silent existed, the fine would be ille-
gal and the statute that authorized it would not be on the books. A true
right to remain silent and the state's legal right to penalize someone for
remaining silent are mutually exclusive propositions. In contrast, Grano
might have argued that when an interrogator makes a threat in an interroga-
tion room by stating that he will take away the suspect's cigarettes until she
confesses, for example, no legal process exists to back up that threat.30 3 No
statute, regulation, or court order exists that specifically authorizes this
threat, and no formal legal procedure exists for enforcing it.3"4
This distinction, however, is logically insignificant. Threats in both
formal and informal settings make a claim of right to the suspect's state-
ment; both say to the suspect or defendant, "I have a right to your state-
ments and will penalize you if you do not talk." The only difference is that
the three dollar fine in the formal setting asserts a formal legal right backed
up by legal process, while the police officer's threat in the informal inter-
rogation setting asserts a right arising by virtue of the police officer's state-
given position, his badge, his holstered firearm, and his position of domi-
nance and control over the suspect. The fact that such a threat is not sup-
ported by formal legal process does not make it less of a threat, less of a
penalty, or less of a claim of right for practical purposes. An officer who
takes a suspect's cigarettes as a penalty imposed for refusing to confess
sends a message to the suspect that the officer has a right to the suspect's
confession without providing the suspect with immunity. Both the suspect
and the officer know that the officer will not be charged with theft for
taking the cigarettes (as a civilian may be for taking personal possession of
the suspect's property). And for practical purposes, the officer will not be
if it was obtained by imposing a penalty that makes a claim of right in the manner stated in the text. In
other words, under Chavez as applied to the objective penalties test, an interrogator arguably can make
a claim of right under the self-incrimination clause if the interrogator does not later use the resulting
confession against the suspect. However, if government subsequently attempts to admit the confession
into evidence at trial, this Article asserts that a retrospective analysis of compulsion would be
conducted, and the confession would be inadmissible if the interrogator made a claim of right to the
suspect's confession or otherwise imposed a penalty on the suspect to provoke speech or punish
silence. Finally, this discussion assumes that immunity has not been provided to the suspect during the
interrogation.
303. See Thomas & Bilder, supra note 3, at 258 (noting lack of legal process to back up threats in
interrogation setting).
304. Again, this assumes smoking is not prohibited in the location where the interrogation takes
place. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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prohibited from making good on his threat until a confession takes place.
The police officer is asserting a right that he is free to exercise under
existing law as long as he does not employ such intense pressure that the
suspect's confession will be deemed involuntary.
Another reason why there is no credible distinction between a penalty
in a formal setting and a penalty in an informal setting is that a threat by a
police officer in an interrogation room exerts more coercive pressure on a
suspect than a similar threat made in the formal setting of a courtroom. A
defendant who is threatened with a three dollar fine if he refuses to testify
at his trial receives this threat in a proceeding open to the public and
flanked by an attorney. It is not difficult to imagine a trial defendant mak-
ing a calm and rational decision, after consultation with counsel, to pay the
three dollar fine rather than risk taking the stand and testifying. A suspect
under interrogation, however, who has an officer impose a small penalty on
her for not confessing, such as taking away her cigarettes, is often without
counsel, isolated from public scrutiny, and at the officer's mercy. The sus-
pect would be rational to assume that the officer will continue to impose
additional penalties of increasing severity until the officer is satisfied.
Defining compulsion broadly enough to prohibit any and all penalties
imposed during an interrogation to provoke speech or punish silence also
serves an important public policy objective. Interpreting the self-
incrimination clause to prohibit all penalties creates a bright-line rule that
is easier to apply in both interrogation rooms and courtrooms.3"5 Under the
laundry list approach, a court might easily hold that an officer's act of
slapping a suspect across the face for refusing to confess is an impermissi-
ble penalty. But what is the result if an officer uses his middle finger and
thumb to flick at a suspect, causing only a slight, momentary sting? Is a
flick to the arm or leg permissible but a flick to the face a violation? Where
does one draw the line at what is a permissible or impermissible penalty?
The broader, all-inclusive definition of penalty provides that any pen-
alty imposed on a suspect to provoke speech or punish silence violates the
self-incrimination clause because it makes a claim of right to the suspect's
statement. Thus, this broad definition avoids having to guess on an ad hoc
basis whether a given interrogation technique will ultimately get a thumbs
up or thumbs down from the Court because it eviscerates the need for
making hair splitting and seemingly arbitrary distinctions that would be
unavoidable with the laundry list approach.
Finally, the broad, all-inclusive definition of penalty is more consis-
tent with a true right to remain silent. If a right to silence exists, any pen-
alty imposed as a condition on that right is illegitimate and inconsistent
305. Regarding the Supreme Court's preference for bright-line rules in constitutional criminal
procedure, see Alschuler, supra note 192; LaFave, supra note 192, at 321-23.
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with the Court's own declarations that the self-incrimination clause grants
suspects a true right to remain silent.3"6
306. When this Article speaks of a true right to remain silent, it refers to the right not to have
compelled self-incriminating statements admitted against a defendant at trial. See generally Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (holding that the self-incrimination clause is implicated only when the
government seeks to admit a confession against the defendant at trial); see also supra note 302. In his
seminal 1996 article, Professor Alschuler argues that the true and absolute right to remain silent
recognized in recent decades by the Supreme Court is contrary to the Framer's intent. Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MicH. L.
REv. 2625, 2638-60 (1996). Alschuler essentially argues that the Framers would have intended the self-
incrimination clause to adopt the laundry list approach, which would allow less severe forms of
pressure during an interrogation. Id. at 2651-52; see also supra Part I.B.2. For the reasons stated herein,
the all-inclusive approach, while perhaps providing greater protection to suspects than the Framers
would have intended, is consistent with the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements on the
subject, particularly in the formal setting cases. Adopting the all-inclusive approach would thereby
bring confession law into harmony with the formal setting cases. Sound policy reasons delineated in the
text above further support this interpretation.
In McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), five Justices of the Court in a plurality opinion arguably, at
first glance, adopted the view that the self-incrimination clause does not prohibit the imposition of de
minimis penalties imposed for the exercise of the one's right to remain silent. Id. at 41-42, 52-54.
McKune can be distinguished, however, on the ground that the alleged penalties imposed occurred in
the prison context. The case involved a claim by an inmate who alleged that his Fifth Amendment
rights were violated when he lost certain prison privileges because he refused to participate in a
mandated sex offender program that required him to admit past offenses. Justice Kennedy, joined by
three other Justices, took special pains to point out that the case involved consequences imposed on
"prisoners, rather than ordinary citizens," Id. at 36, and distinguished the formal setting cases by noting
that those cases dealt with free citizens rather than prisoners. Id. at 39-40. Justice Kennedy stated that a
"broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in a free society fall within the
expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction. The Court has
instructed that rehabilitation is a legitimate penological interest that must be weighed against the
exercise of an inmate's liberty." Id. at 36. Justice Kennedy further expounded:
The compulsion inquiry must consider the significant restraints already inherent in prison life
and the State's own vital interests in rehabilitation goals and procedures within the prison
system. A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear a rational
relation to a legitimate penological objective, does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination if the adverse consequences an inmate faces for not participating are related to
the program objectives and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Id. at 37-38. see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (holding that an inmate's silence
at a prison disciplinary hearing may be used against him at such a prison proceeding because the
proceeding implicated "the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for
crime."); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (requiring a probationer to appear and discuss
matters that affect his probationer's status with his probation officer does not violate self-incrimination
clause because he was not faced with any reasonably perceived threat of revocation). In addition,
Justice Kennedy seemed to classify the consequences imposed on the inmate to be deprivations of
benefits rather than negative penalties. Id at 29 (classifying the prison procedure as offering
"incentives" rather than imposing penalties). For a discussion of the distinction between threats
(penalties) and offers (benefits) see infra Part IV.C.
Justice O'Connor, writing alone and casting the decisive fifth vote for the plurality, did not
distinguish the prison context from the formal setting cases involving free citizens. Justice O'Connor
also disagreed with the other four justices in the plurality in that she believed the consequences
imposed constituted penalties rather than benefits denied. Id. at 53-54 ("[T]his case indisputably
involves burdens rather than benefits .... ). Rather, Justice O'Connor seemed to adopt the laundry
list approach to the self-incrimination clause and argued simply that the penalties imposed in McKune
were not sufficiently serious to constitute compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 48-53.
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This broad interpretation of penalty may appear overly protective of
suspects and have more of a restraining effect on police coercion than
existing law. Such an interpretation, however, would not unduly hamper
interrogations. Indeed, society has a well-founded need for officers to inter-
rogate suspects and to obtain confessions. The objective test would allow
officers to conduct these important interrogations while respecting the
Justice O'Connor then stated: "I believe the proper theory should recognize that it is generally
acceptable to impose the risk of punishment, however great, so long as the actual imposition of such
punishment is accomplished through a fair criminal process." Id. at 53. She then cited to McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which held that the difficult choice to testify or not that a defendant
naturally faces in a non-bifurcated capital trial (testifying might help a capital defendant in the
sentencing aspect of the jury's determination, but might simultaneously undermine his efforts in
relation to the jury's determination of guilt) does not constitute compulsion. Id.; McGautha, 402 U.S.
at 213-21. McGautha is an example of what this Article will call the "criminal process" cases, in which
the Court has held that certain difficult choices that naturally present themselves to a defendant from
necessary aspects of the criminal process do not constitute compulsion. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (stating that if a defendant chooses to rely on an alibi defense, he may be compelled
to disclose the substance of the defense prior to trial or be barred from asserting it in order for his
criminal trial to operate without disruption); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (commenting
that if a criminal defendant chooses to testify in his own defense at trial, he may be impeached with his
pre-arrest silence; the self-incrimination clause cannot be used a license to commit perjury);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (noting that plea bargaining is an encouraged part of the
criminal process and does not violate the self-incrimination clause); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (explaining that Ohio's provision requiring an interview with the parole
board for those inmates who seek clemency does not violate the self-incrimination clause because the
option to seek clemency is a voluntary choice for an inmate in the criminal process; Ohio's procedure
represents a benefit denied to inmate's who remain silent rather than penalty imposed, and also benefit
is not automatically denied in response to inmate's silence). Justice O'Connor then quoted the
following language from McGautha: "The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete
with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. Although a
defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses,
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose." Id. at 53 (quoting
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 213). Justice O'Connor then succinctly summarized her rationale by stating:
"Forcing defendants to accept such consequences seems to me very different from imposing penalties
for the refusal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and appear, starkly, as
government attempts to compel testimony; in the latter context, any penalty that is capable of
compelling a person to be a witness against himself is illegitimate." Id. In sum, Justice O'Connor
characterized McKune as a criminal process case, in which the government may impose penalties on a
defendant for a legitimate reason as a necessary part of a fair criminal process. See United States v.
Antelope, 2005 WL 170738 (9th Cir., Jan. 27, 2005) ("[T]he controlling issue [in Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in McKune] is the state's purpose in imposing the penalty: Although it may be acceptable
for the state to impose harsh penalties on defendants when it has legitimate reasons for doing so
consistent with their conviction for their crimes of incarceration, it is a different thing to 'impose
penalties for the refusal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and appear, starkly,
as government attempts to compel testimony."') (quoting McKune, 402 U.S. at 53). Interrogation,
however, is not analogous to and has never been considered by the Court as a context where a suspect
faces a choice that flows naturally from a necessary part of the criminal process. The imposition of
penalties during interrogation is not a required or inherent part of the criminal process and represents
the clearest example of the government attempting to compel testimony without a legitimate reason
related to such things as penological goals or the efficient management of criminal trials. Thus, this
Article asserts that neither Justice Kennedy's or Justice O'Connor's opinions in McKune, nor the
criminal process cases, represent clear and binding precedent against the application of an all-inclusive
standard for penalties in the interrogation context.
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suspect's right to remain silent by not penalizing the suspect in any way for
her refusal to confess. As the formal setting cases recognize, the right to
remain silent demands such a test, or it is not a true right at all.
2. Creation of the Baseline of the Interrogation to Determine What
Constitutes a Penalty
Resolving the scope of how broadly to define what constitutes a
penalty still leaves unanswered the question of what exactly constitutes a
penalty. A rich pool of philosophical scholarship addresses the question of
what constitutes improper coercion." 7 Such philosophical considerations
are directly applicable to this Article's endeavor to develop a new objective
penalties test. The touchstone to determining the sets of facts that amount
to improper coercion is the "baseline" of the interrogation. This baseline is
determined by analyzing the objective facts regarding the suspect's rights
and conditions at the beginning of the interrogation. The relevant question
for the Court to ask is whether, in light of this baseline, a reasonable person
would objectively conclude that the interrogating officer acted in such a
way as to punish silence or provoke speech by changing the suspect's
status quo to her detriment. Such an act should be considered an impermis-
sible penalty.
The baseline is largely a function of the environment in which the
interrogation takes place and the rights the parties are generally allowed in
this setting. Imagine, for example, an ongoing interrogation of a suspect
who has thus far refused to confess. The baseline would be very different if
the interrogation takes place in the custodial environment of a police
station as opposed to the private space of the suspect's home. If smoking is
not allowed in the police station, a reasonable suspect's baseline in the
interrogation includes the fact that she cannot smoke. If the suspect takes
out a cigarette during this interrogation, and the officer promptly removes
it from the suspect's mouth and says, "Smoking is not allowed here," the
officer has not changed the suspect's baseline to her detriment. The officer
has simply maintained the status quo. If the interrogation takes place in the
suspect's home and the suspect is not in custody, however, the officer
would have no legitimate basis to penalize the suspect by taking away her
cigarette. This act would be a penalty because the suspect had the right to
smoke in her own home before the officer began applying pressure. In
other words, it sends the message that the suspect's exercise of her right to
307. The philosophical texts on which the analysis in this Section is based include ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
101 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972); Thomas, supra note 265.
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remain silent will become increasingly costly and, thus, the officer makes a
claim of right to the suspect's confession.08
This example demonstrates that the baseline should be determined by
analyzing the objective facts regarding the suspect's rights and conditions
at the beginning of the interrogation. These facts would be drawn from
rules, regulations, and custom. If a suspect has a right to use the restroom
whenever she pleases, as would be the case in nearly any interrogation
whether in custody or in the suspect's home, depriving the suspect of that
right would be a penalty. If the suspect has the right to eat whenever she
pleases, deprivation of food would likewise change the status quo to the
suspect's detriment. If the suspect, however, is in a custodial environment
where eating is allowed only at mealtimes, then depriving the suspect of
food and informing her that she will have to wait until the next mealtime
would not be a penalty. Physical violence, such as slapping a suspect,
would always constitute a penalty, because there are no situations in which
a police officer in this country is allowed to use physical violence when a
suspect is not physically resisting but is merely refusing to talk.
Police departments cannot change the parties' baseline in custodial
interrogations by merely changing the rules and customs regarding the
conditions of custody so as to change the parties' baseline in custodial
interrogations. For example, a police department cannot issue a new
departmental regulation stating that all officers are free to torture suspects
while in custody as outside constraints would prevent this from happening.
Constitutional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment, the Eight
308. The Supreme Court has already fashioned a somewhat similar approach in the context of
determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea in the plea bargaining context. In Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1977), for example, the Court held that a prosecutor's comment during plea
bargaining that he would reindict the defendant on charges carrying a more severe penalty if the
defendant did not plead guilty to the original charges did not render the resulting plea involuntary. Id. at
357. The Court emphasized that the prosecutor had sufficient evidence at the time he made this
statement to bring the additional charges against the defendant. Id. at 359, 364. Thus, one could easily
argue that the possibility of additional charges were already part of the defendant's status quo in that
case, and the prosecutor was simply offering a positive benefit to the suspect (by reducing the universe
of charges that he faced) rather than changing his status quo to his detriment. See also Ohio Adult
Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1998) (Ohio's clemency procedure, which requires an
applicant to submit to an interview with the parole board, does not constitute compulsion because
clemency is a benefit offered (a voluntary option) that the applicant is not required to seek). In McKune
v. Lile, the respondent argued that the Court should adopt a "reward/penalty" distinction with a
determined baseline to determine what constitutes a penalty in the context of prison administrative
proceedings. MeKune, 536 U.S. at 45-46; see also supra note 306. Justice Kennedy, writing for three
other Justices in a plurality decision, rejected this approach, stating that the baseline theory would be
unworkable in that context. Id. Justice Kennedy based his decision on the inevitable difficulties of
determining the baseline of inmates in the prison context because it is subject to arbitrary
"administrative factors beyond.., the control" of prison officials. Id. at 46. Justice Kennedy's opinion
in McKune does not set the baseline theory proffered in this Article against direct Supreme Court
authority because Justice Kennedy's opinion in McKune is not a holding of the Court, and it can be
distinguished as arising in the prison context. This Article asserts that the Court could and should create
a workable baseline theory in the interrogation context.
[Vol. 93:465
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Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the due process
Rochin doctrine (prohibiting outrageous conduct) °9 will keep the baseline
at levels comparable to what they are now. In other words, these provisions
already regulate the conditions of custody and continue to ensure that
police departments maintain reasonable rules and regulations that reflect
parties' baseline expectations. In addition, societal pressure and the democ-
ratic process will prevent police departments from implementing such dra-
conian conditions of custody. In the unlikely event that such measures fail
to maintain a reasonable baseline, the courts can create a general rule
establishing a reasonable baseline in custodial interrogation cases that indi-
vidual police departments cannot circumvent through regulations or policy
changes.3"O
The objective penalties test proposed herein is logically intuitive and
would be much easier for police officers to apply in the field and judges to
apply in courtrooms than the involuntary confession rule when determining
the admissibility of confessions. When an interrogation take places in a
non-custodial environment, such as a suspect's home or place of employ-
ment, and the facts are such that the Fourth Amendment does not allow for
the officer to place the suspect under arrest or take her into custody, then
the suspect has an absolute right to do whatever she pleases, including
simply walking away or refusing to answer the officer's pointed questions.
If the officer prohibits her from doing as she pleases in a manner that a rea-
sonable person would conclude was done to punish silence or provoke
speech, then the officer has imposed a penalty. This result is entirely con-
sistent with the notion that the suspect has a right to remain silent and to
not be penalized for doing so. In a custodial situation, however, the inter-
rogating officer would usually already be aware of, or could easily dis-
cover, the objective facts that comprise the suspect's baseline.3 ' Custodial
309. See infra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
310. Admittedly, this objective penalty test might be problematic during interrogations of non-
Americans abroad, such as those taking place at the current time in the "War on Terror." In these
international interrogations, it is currently unclear if other constitutional provisions and international
norms and customs apply, and it is thus unclear what rights a suspect enjoys as part of her baseline. At
the present time, it is not apparent, and it is in fact doubtful, that non-American suspects being held and
interrogated outside the United States are being given the benefit of existing standards, such as
Miranda warnings and the due process involuntary confession rule. Thus, the difficulty in applying the
objective penalties test to non-Americans abroad does not present a hurdle that is not already present
under existing law. If the objective penalties test were employed domestically and it were later
determined that non-Americans interrogated abroad are entitled to the same rights during an
interrogation that those within the borders of the United States enjoy, the test could be modified for that
limited context with the creation of a generic, reasonable baseline to be used in all international cases.
311. One might note that a suspect who is not in custody would have greater latitude during an
interrogation than one who is in custody. Thus, under this test, the police would be able to apply greater
pressure to a suspect against whom they have developed sufficient evidence to take into custody. This
dichotomy comports with Kent Greenawalt's conception of morality, in which he argues that the
amount of pressure that the police should be allowed to employ during an interrogation should relate to
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rules are generally clear as to the rights of and restrictions on persons in
custody. If difficulties occasionally arise in determining the baseline of an
interrogation, however, these ambiguities would pale in comparison to an
interrogator's task under the due process involuntary confession rule. 312
B. Interrogation as an Objective Penalty: The Role o'
Miranda Warnings
In light of the analysis above, it is not clear whether an interrogation
itself constitutes an objective penalty in violation of the self-incrimination
clause. On one hand, a law enforcement officer's act of simply asking a
suspect a pointed question, such as, "Where were you at ten o'clock last
night?" should not be considered a penalty or, at least, that the suspect is
free to ignore this question, tune it out, and walk away. On the other hand,
if the officer continues to ask questions, eventually a reasonable suspect
would feel harassed and infer that her freedom of choice is now limited to
some degree. She may think, "I must keep listening to these questions and
providing answers the officer doesn't like-all of which is seriously dis-
rupting what I otherwise want to do-unless I tell the officer what he wants
to hear." The suspect's freedom of choice has been limited at this point to
her detriment.313 This restraint on freedom would be a penalty imposed by
the officer in response to the suspect's exercise of her constitutional right
to remain silent.
The solution to this dilemma would be to employ Miranda-type warn-
ings at the outset of nearly all interrogations and to employ Miranda-type
rules regarding when an officer must cut-off questioning after a suspect
invokes her rights. Informing a suspect that she has the right to remain si-
lent and cut off the interrogation would ensure that the interrogation itself
does not become a penalty or, at least, the suspect can freely maintain her
status quo when the interrogation starts to resemble a penalty. Miranda
warnings would continue to be required under this theory as a prophylactic
rule but based on a different theory. Rather than requiring Miranda warn-
ings to dissipate the atmospheric pressure supposedly associated with the
first question of any custodial interrogation, this theory would be based on
the presence of a pending, concrete penalty and, thus, would be consistent
with the theoretical underpinnings of the formal setting cases.314 Rather
the amount of evidence they have to show that the suspect has committed the crime in question. See R.
Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981).
312. See supra notes 8-26 and accompanying text.
313. George C. Thomas III has argued in like fashion that interrogation carries with it an implicit
threat. Thomas, supra note 265, at 93. A police officer "implies that he will continue the interrogation
if [the suspect] does not answer to his satisfaction." Id.
314. See discussion of Dickerson supra Part III.C. The penalty-based theory with respect to the
Miranda warnings set forth in this Article finds support by analogy to the Court's reasoning in Carter
v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981). In Carter, the Court held that a trial court must, upon request from
[Vol. 93:465
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than focusing on intangible pressures that perhaps render Miranda incon-
sistent with the formal setting cases" 5 and historical origins of the self-
incrimination clause,3 16 warnings would be required prophylactically to
ensure that the interrogation itself does not become a penalty and to
empower the suspect to maintain her baseline regarding her relationship
with the law enforcement officer. Under this theory, Miranda warnings
would be required at the outset of nearly all interrogations, not just the cus-
todial type that create atmospheric pressure.3"7 After Miranda warnings are
provided and questioning begins, an interrogator would be required to stop
all questioning when the suspect indicates that she is no longer willing to
talk. This secondary rule is consistent with existing doctrine and would be
required to ensure that the status quo is maintained."8
In addition, once a suspect has received and waived Miranda warn-
ings, the interrogator would be prohibited from imposing any type of
objective penalty on the suspect to provoke speech or punish silence.
Imposing a penalty on a suspect for remaining silent would be seen as
directly inconsistent with the substance of the Miranda warnings, and thus,
would undo or trump the warnings themselves. In other words, unlike the
presumption of voluntariness that currently arises with the voluntariness
test once the suspect has received and waived the warnings,3"9 the objective
penalties test would apply full force throughout all interrogations. Miranda
warnings would therefore be used in the objective penalties paradigm not
simply to create a presumption in favor of the interrogator, as with the vol-
untariness test. Rather, the warnings would be used only to make sure that
the basic act of interrogation-without any objective penalties imposed
the defendant, instruct the jury not to draw an adverse inference against the defendant for his failure to
testify in his defense. Id. at 301-02. The Court's rationale was that without such instruction, the jury
might decide on its own to penalize the defendant in violation of the self-incrimination clause. Id. Thus,
the Court required an instruction to the jury in order to avoid the imposition of a concrete penalty that is
hypothetically pending in any criminal trial. Likewise, Miranda warnings would be employed under the
objective penalties test to head-off a similar penalty that is pending at the start of any interrogation.
315. See discussion of Dickerson supra Part III.C.
316. See supra Part I.B.2.
317. See supra notes 233-63 and accompanying text. As with any prophylactic rule, exceptions
could be made to make the rule workable in practice. For example, an exception could be made for on-
the-scene interrogations in emergency situations when the interrogation is not prolonged. See supra
notes 272-84 and accompanying text. In the alternative, Miranda warnings might not be required per
se, but their application would be at the officer's discretion when he or she perceived the act of
interrogation might begin to resemble a penalty. Because the officer who refrained from providing
Miranda warnings in such a case would assume the risk that a court will later find that a penalty was
imposed, the practice would certainly develop that officers would routinely provide Miranda warnings
at the outset of almost any interrogation to be on the safe side. However, this flexible rule would free
officers from having to provide the warning in certain circumstances where it is not practicable or
where they intend to ask only a few questions without pressuring the suspect or changing the suspect's
baseline in any way.
318. See supra notes 233-53 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
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separate from and in addition to the act of interrogation
itself-did not turn into a penalty in the manner described in this section.
In other words, a suspect's waiver of the Miranda warnings would be seen
only as an agreement to continue talking with the officer without having
the interrogation itself amount to a penalty. Waiver would not be seen as
an agreement that the officer may impose new and additional penalties on
the suspect. In this way, the objective penalties test avoids one of the major
problems with the voluntariness test and Miranda as currently imple-
mented, which is that once the warnings are provided, courts offer little or
no oversight of what goes on during interrogations. 20
C. Extrinsic Threats: Distinguishing Threats from Offers
Not all statements made by interrogators constitute penalties. Some
statements may be threats while others may be offers. Threats, not offers,
should be considered objective penalties. Philosophical literature exten-
sively discusses the distinction between threats and offers and serves as the
foundation for the central role this distinction plays in the objective penal-
ties test that this Article advances. As stated above, determining a suspect's
baseline regarding the objective conditions or rights of the environment in
which the interrogation takes place, referred to here as "intrinsic facts,"
would not be a difficult task. Preexisting rules, regulations, and norms
already define what rights the suspect enjoys and does not enjoy during an
interrogation. For example, if an interrogator took away a suspect's
cigarettes during an interrogation, the preexisting rules regarding smoking
in the location where the suspect finds herself during the interrogation
would determine the baseline and provide a ready answer to whether such
conduct constitutes a penalty.
Some interrogators, however, may make threats that are unrelated to
the suspect's conditions or rights during an interrogation. For example, an
officer may hint to a suspect that he will bring charges against the suspect's
husband if she does not confess. Or, in a similar vein, an officer may sug-
gest that if a suspect does not confess, he will report information in his
possession that suggests the suspect is neglectful of her children to the lo-
cal child services department and have her children removed from her cus-
tody. These are "extrinsic facts" because they do not relate to the
environment of the interrogation. The baseline for extrinsic facts is
320. Id. Under the objective penalties test, whether the Miranda warnings would be required in the
same form and with the same substance that they are today is a question that will be addressed in a
subsequent article by this author. In addition, this Article asserts that the self-incrimination clause
would be self-executing under the objective penalties test and would not have to be affirmatively
asserted by the suspect. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). This issue will also be
addressed in a subsequent article by the author. Finally, the question of whether or not the Miranda
waiver procedure in this context would be governed by a voluntariness test, or a penalties-based test,
will be addressed in a subsequent article by the author.
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typically not facially apparent from outside sources. For example, does the
officer have the right to bring charges against the suspect's husband? Does
the officer have the right to inform the local child services department of
her neglectful conduct toward her children? By invoking such possible
consequences, does the officer make a threat and change the baseline status
quo to the suspect's detriment, or is the officer simply informing the sus-
pect of unpleasant facts that are already part of the suspect's pre-existing
baseline?
In both examples, many scenarios exist in which the officer would
have a right to take the action in question. Indeed, the officer might have a
duty to report neglectful conduct to the child services department.
Allowing pre-existing rights of the officer to define the baseline for
extrinsic facts, however, presents a difficulty not present with intrinsic
facts. If an officer's rights were used as the baseline for extrinsic facts,
clever interrogators could drum up a myriad of questionable tactics to
improperly coerce suspects into confessing. Under such a scenario, interro-
gators could, as a matter of course, begin interrogations by stating: "If you
do not confess, I am going to attempt to have your children removed from
your custody, bring charges against your husband, inform your employer of
everything bad I know about you, intensely investigate all of your friends
and family to see if they've failed to pay all their taxes or committed any
other illegal act, hold a press conference about the case, smear your name
across the front page of the newspapers, etc." The officer could, in essence,
threaten to end the suspect's life as she knows it, all of which he techni-
cally might have the right to do in a given case.
When considering whether an alleged threat tied to an extrinsic fact
constitutes a penalty, therefore, one must make the vital distinction
between statements by interrogators labeled as threats, which constitute
penalties, and offers, which do not. When an officer threatens a suspect
that he will have her children removed from her custody if she does not
confess, is he threatening to impose a penalty? Or, on the other hand, is he
making the following offer of a benefit that actually improves the suspect's
status quo?: "If you confess, I'll cut you some slack and not have your
children taken away from you, which is something I would otherwise do."
To distinguish threats from offers, an essay entitled Coercion by
Harvard philosophy professor Robert Nozick,32 and an article entitled A
Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination by Rutgers professor
George C. Thomas II1322 are helpful starting points. Nozick, Thomas and
others have discussed various theories by which one can semantically
attempt to distinguish penalizing threats from non-penalizing offers. Each
theory adopts a different source to determine the baseline, such as the
321. Nozick, supra note 307.
322. Thomas, supra note 265.
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empirical/statistical baseline, the phenomenological baseline, and the
normative/moral baseline.323 While each of these theories are instructive to
the task at hand, a detailed discussion of each would be a law review article
in and of itself and is beyond the scope of this Article. The goal in this
Article is to create a method for arriving at a new baseline for extrinsic
facts, arising from the initial threat/offer distinction in the philosophical
literature, which would have practical application in the interrogation
rooms and courtrooms of America.
The proper baseline for extrinsic facts would be objective and would
be based on actions of a reasonable police officer in the interrogator's
situation. It would use reasonable law enforcement practices, customs,
norms and societal expectations as the guidelines. The baseline would be
determined by examining the external fact in question (for example,
removing children from custody, bringing charges against husband) and
making a judgment as to whether a reasonable police officer in the interro-
gator's situation would probably cause the fact in question to occur even if
the suspect were not under interrogation and the officer did not desire a
confession. If so, the fact was already part of the suspect's baseline when
the interrogation began. By stating that this fact will not come to pass if the
suspect confesses, the officer has offered the suspect a non-penalizing
benefit. On the other hand, if a reasonable officer, based on reasonable law
enforcement practices, norms, and customs and societal expectations,
would probably not cause this fact to occur were it not for his desire to
obtain a confession, the statement should be deemed a threat to violate the
baseline to the suspect's detriment. The threat would thus impose an
impermissible penalty.
For example, if an officer states that he will bring charges against the
suspect's husband if she does not confess and it turns out that the police
had insufficient evidence that the husband actually committed a crime, or if
the alleged illegal activity occurred in the distant past and had heretofore
been overlooked by the police in the exercise of their inherent discretion, a
court can readily conclude that the statement was made as a threat. The
baseline of the interrogation was that the husband would not be charged,
and the officer threatened to violate the baseline to the suspect's detriment
by invoking this extrinsic fact. If, however, the husband was an alleged
accomplice of the suspect in the very crime for which the suspect is under-
going interrogation and sufficient evidence exists to bring charges against
him as well, cutting a deal to overlook the husband's role in the offense
should be seen as an offer.
Making the distinction between offers and threats would be relatively
easy in many circumstances. Out-of-the-norm statements, such as an
officer's statement that without a confession he will intensely investigate
323. See generally id. (discussing various baseline theories).
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the suspect's friends and family to determine if they had evaded taxes,
should easily be seen as a threat. Thus, the objective penalties test gener-
ally does a sound job of distinguishing between offers and threats with re-
spect to out-of-the-norm statements by interrogating officers. This test
would serve to curb flagrant penalties, which might theoretically be
permissible in some circumstances under the due process involuntary con-
fession rule.
One could criticize the extrinsic facts aspect of the objective penalties
test on the basis that some comments made by interrogators may present
closer calls and more difficult determinations. Two responses to such criti-
cism are possible. First, the more difficult extrinsic fact determination
would not arise that often. Common experience suggests that intrinsic facts
are more often the subject of discussion during run-of-the-mill interroga-
tions than extrinsic facts, and the objective penalties test can be applied
with relative ease with respect to intrinsic facts. Thus, most cases would be
decided easily. Second, even when a court is called upon to evaluate a
threat or offer by an interrogator involving an extrinsic fact that is particu-
larly tricky, the objective penalties test still provides the court more
guidance than the current due process involuntary confession rule. The
court would have the guidance of objective criteria grounded in common
sense, such as societal expectations, norms, and reasonable law enforce-
ment practices and customs. In contrast, a court's task under the due proc-
ess involuntary confession rule requires the court to divine the subjective
state of mind of the suspect based on an unlimited number of factors and
without tethers to any objective criteria.324
Furthermore, the objective penalties test puts the law enforcement
officer on notice that he will ultimately have the burden of proving, based
on custom and past experience, that the occurrence of the extrinsic fact
mentioned was a foregone conclusion and, thus, already part of the sus-
pect's existing status quo at the start of the interrogation. If, for example, a
law enforcement officer desires to obtain a confession by stating that the
suspect's husband will not be charged with a crime if she confesses, the
officer will know that he will later have to demonstrate that the evidence to
charge the husband was available at the time of the interrogation. The
officers will also know that he will have to demonstrate that the standard
practices of a reasonable law enforcement officer indicate that the husband
would have been charged even if the deal with the suspect had not been
made. The universe of information that an officer must consider before
making his decision is limited. This test, therefore, provides law enforce-
ment with clearer guidelines as to their risks and what is at stake during an
interrogation. In contrast, under the highly subjective due process involun-
tary confession rule, many facts that will later become important to the
324. See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
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admissibility of a confession, such as the suspect's education, psychologi-
cal weaknesses, etc., are often completely unknown and unknowable to the
police at the time of the interrogation, leaving law enforcement without
bounds or guidelines of any sort.
The relative ease of applying the objective penalties test as compared
to the due process involuntariness rule is best illustrated by imagining what
instructions a supervising officer would give a new police officer before
conducting an interrogation (putting aside any initial instructions regarding
Miranda warnings). Under the existing due process involuntary confession
rule, an officer might be told, "The law says you can't overbear the
suspect's will. That probably means that you can't hit the suspect, but other
than that, it is hard to say because the amount of pressure that will overbear
the suspect's will depends on her psyche, strengths and weaknesses, and
other subjective factors-most of which you won't know about and some
of which could be subconscious or go all the way back to her childhood."
In most cases, a new officer interrogating his first suspect would have no
practical idea about what he can or cannot say or do to the suspect other
than having a vague sense that too much pressure might be problematic. A
particularly clever supervisor, however, might help out the new recruit by
adding the following: "What I told you above is theoretical. In practice,
once you give Miranda warnings, courts presume the confession will be
voluntary, so you can sometimes get away with applying a lot of pressure
as long as it is not really outrageous. So just go for it according to your
instincts." '325
Under an objective penalties test, on the other hand, interrogation
instructions for a new officer would be more concrete and could be as
follows:
You obviously can't hit the suspect or use physical violence. You
also can't take away any of her rights in a way that a judge might
later think you were trying to get her to talk. If she has a right to
smoke or eat or make unlimited phone calls or whatever in the
place you're interrogating her, you've got to let her do it, because
she has a right not to talk to you and taking away something she
could otherwise do sends her the message that she doesn't really
have a right to remain silent. So you can enforce whatever rules
already apply, if any do, and tell her you're just enforcing those
pre-existing rules, but you can't make up any new rules to get her
to confess.
Also, if you're going to offer her anything to get her to
confess-like if this is a case where you would otherwise go to
children's services and have her children removed from her
custody, but you want to tell her that you won't do that if she
325. Regarding the point that courts tend to presume that confessions are voluntary if Miranda
warnings have been provided, see supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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cooperates-you better feel confident that you're really helping her
out by making this offer. You will have to convince a judge later
that a typical officer in your shoes would have referred the case to
children's services even if he didn't want a confession, because the
case called for it. You just offered to help her out-by making a
good deal for her-to get a confession through bargaining. The
thing you're offering her for a confession has to be a true
concession on your part, so that you're making a fair deal with her
that she can think about and consider, rather than coercing her with
threats that you just drum up to get a confession.
An officer could distill this very simply as "no new rules" and "offers
made to get a confession have to be real concessions and not drummed up
or fake." These two guidelines are based in common sense and would be
fairly easy for officers to understand and apply in the field. At a minimum,
this test provides clearer guidelines than simply allowing officers to apply
as much pressure and as many penalties as their instincts tell them they can
get away with without rendering the confession involuntary. At an ensuing
suppression hearing, the court would not be forced to make an "Alice in
Wonderland journey into the metaphysical realm" '326 of freewill as it would
today but rather would conduct two simple inquiries. First, the court would
determine the parties' baseline regarding intrinsic facts based on the readily
available conditions or rights of the interrogation. Second, the court would
determine whether an interrogator who raises extrinsic facts to try to secure
a confession makes a threat or an offer based on objective facts, norms,
customs, and guidelines.
Regarding an extrinsic fact such as an officer's threat or offer that the
suspect's children will not be taken away if she confesses, for example, the
officer would testify at the hearing regarding whether the alleged offer in
question fell within existing practices based on the facts of the case. The
officer could perhaps cite to other cases with similar facts in which the
officer in question referred the case to child services despite not seeking a
confession. Either side could also, for example, call someone from the
child services department as a witness to testify whether this case was one
that the police would typically, in everyday practice, refer to them for fur-
ther action. In the end, the court would make a common sense determina-
tion as to whether it believed the statement was really an offer or a threat.
The prosecution, with the burden of proof, would have to carry the day to
have the confession rendered admissible.
On a related point, it is a fairly universal practice in the United States
that law enforcement officers do not have the authority to plea bargain with
suspects regarding charging and sentencing issues during interrogations.
Prosecutors ultimately decide what charges are to be brought against a
326. See Benner, supra note 4, at 116.
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suspect and negotiate lenient sentences in the process of plea bargaining
with defense counsel. It is not uncommon, however, for police officers to
hint to a suspect that she might receive lenient treatment from the prosecu-
tor if she confesses. A common phrase used by interrogators is, "If you
talk, I will let the prosecutor know that you are cooperating. '2 7 Under the
due process involuntary confession rule as it is currently applied, most
courts hold that such suggestions of leniency alone do not render a confes-
sion involuntary.328 The objective penalties test would reach the same result
in these cases, as generic hints of leniency would typically be considered
offers rather than threats.
If the objective penalties test was adopted, the test for alleged extrin-
sic threats would develop on a case-by-case basis, with a growing body of
precedent making the test clearer and clearer as it evolved. 9 An important
additional benefit that this test offers is the ability for courts to effectively
monitor what occurs during interrogations after the Miranda warnings are
given. Most courts today simply presume that any confession rendered
after Miranda warnings were provided and waived was probably voluntary.
There is, therefore, very little oversight of police conduct after the first few
seconds of an interrogation.33° The objective penalties test gives clearer
guidelines as to how the police must behave after Miranda warnings are
administered.
D. Psychological Pressures as Objective Penalties
Interrogators frequently utilize a fair amount of psychological pres-
sure to induce confessions and these confessions are often held admissible
at trial.3 ' For example, interrogators may use religion, raw emotion, tricks,
or morality plays to guilt or fool a suspect into confessing. Does the
employment of such tactics constitute a penalty?
Under the due process involuntary confession rule, psychological
pressure is allowed as long as the suspect's will is not overborne-a test
which, once again, provides little guidance. One could characterize psycho-
logical pressure as a penalty by asserting that it violates the baseline to the
suspect's detriment. The theory would be that when such techniques are
employed, the interrogator has caused the suspect's mood to change for the
327. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing cases where
courts held permissible comments by interrogators that they would let the prosecutor know that the
suspect has cooperated).
328. See, e.g., id.
329. New legal standards are best developed and tested over time and on a case-by-case basis.
This Article, therefore, makes no attempt to answer every question that could possibly arise concerning
the application of the objective penalties test.
330. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
331. See id.
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worse. This unwanted depression, guilt, or anxiety could be considered a
penalty.
However, there are two reasons why only tangible, objectively identi-
fiable violations of the suspect's baseline, such as those that have been dis-
cussed thus far in this Article, should constitute penalties. First, the formal
setting cases suggest mere psychological pressure does not qualify as an
impermissible penalty.332 In the formal setting, trial defendants are rou-
tinely subjected to psychological pressure to testify. 333 When a crime vic-
tim takes the stand and tells her emotionally wrenching story about the
defendant's alleged actions, the defendant sits in the courtroom and pre-
sumably feels the same sort of guilt and pressure that a talented interroga-
tor could elicit in the interrogation room. In addition, it is not uncommon in
opening or closing arguments for a prosecutor to point to the defendant
and, with the jury and courtroom looking on, list the horrendous acts that
the defendant committed.34 Undoubtedly, defendants routinely feel power-
ful psychological pressure to speak at trial, none of which has ever been
considered to violate the self-incrimination clause. It is only when the state
solemnizes this pressure into a tangible and concrete penalty that the Court
finds impermissible compulsion.
Second, considering mere psychological pressure to be an objective
penalty is undesirable on policy grounds. Intangible pressures such as guilt
are nearly impossible to measure. Extending the category of penalties to
include changes in mood or feelings caused by psychological pressure
would create the same type of ambiguity and subjectivity that haunts the
due process involuntary confession rule. Psychological pressures should,
therefore, not be considered penalties. Pressures of this type are better
suited for regulation under the due process clauses.
E. Filling in the Gaps: The Remaining Role of Due Process
One might conclude that, in many ways, the objective penalties test
proposed in this Article would have more of a restraining effect on police
coercion than existing law. The current due process involuntary confession
rule often allows many penalties to be imposed on suspects, all of which
are inconsistent with the right to remain silent and thus would be imper-
missible under an objective penalties test. On the other hand, many coer-
cive techniques that might render a confession involuntary would not be
impermissible under the objective penalties test. For example,
332. See supra Part II.B.1, notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
333. See id.
334. Such comments during opening and closing statements were the standard practice in the
United States Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New York when I practiced there as a
prosecutor from 1996 to 2001. As a prosecutor in that office, I was taught that this was a particularly
effective trial technique.
335. See supra Part II.B. 1; supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
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psychological pressure can sometimes render a confession involuntary but
would not qualify as a penalty. 36 Likewise, an offer by a police officer that
he will refrain from having the suspect's children removed from her cus-
tody if she confesses might sometimes render a confession involuntary, but
the same statement may not be a penalty if it is determined to be an offer
rather than a threat.337
To bridge this gap, existing due process doctrines should serve to but-
tress the court's confession analysis where the objective penalties test falls
short. The initial use of Miranda warnings should stem from a compulsion
analysis informed by the objective penalties test rather than the amorphous
voluntariness analysis employed today. When analyzing an interrogation
after Miranda warnings are given and questioning ensues, the interroga-
tor's conduct should be analyzed to determine if an objective penalty was
imposed by the interrogator to provoke speech or punish silence. If so, the
resulting confession should be suppressed. However, if implemented, the
objective penalties test should be supplemented by existing due process
doctrines as back-up doctrines to the objective penalties test. Two distinct
ways exist by which this could occur.
First, the objective penalties test could be applied as the first tier of
analysis under the self-incrimination clause. The current voluntariness test
could be applied as a secondary and complementary due process doctrine.
Under such a system, a confession that survived the objective penalties test
would still be inadmissible if the confession was involuntarily made. The
due process involuntary confession rule would typically only need to be
invoked as the back-up test in cases where psychological pressures or
tricks were applied to the suspect in a way that rendered the confession
involuntary or where a non-penalizing offer was made to the suspect that
overbore the suspect's will. The example provided supra, of an interrogator
offering not to report the suspect to children's services if she confesses, is a
perfect example of a situation in which the involuntary confession rule may
render a confession inadmissible where the objective penalties test may not
(such a statement would pass the objective penalties test only in a case
where it was a true beneficial offer to the suspect and thus not a penalty, as
discussed supra).
This first alternative would be better than existing doctrine, because it
would interject the long-ignored requirements of the self-incrimination
clause into confession law. As an overlay first-step doctrine, the objective
penalties test would provide greater guidance to officers than current law
and would also empower courts to monitor what goes on during interroga-
tions after Miranda warnings have been given and waived. The obvious
problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to completely rid
336. See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 321-327 and accompanying text.
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confession law of the problematic voluntariness doctrine this Article seeks
to debunk.
A second, more desirable alternative is to rid confession law of the
involuntary confessions rule altogether. The objective penalties test would
then be the sole constitutional confession doctrine, flanked by two existing
due process doctrines.
The first supplementary doctrine is the due process right to a fair
trial.338 A confession that passes the objective penalties test may be so un-
reliable that its admission would result in an unfair trial. Such a confession
would be suppressed under this due process doctrine. Clearly, certain non-
penalizing offers that would not violate the objective penalties test might
result in confessions that were quite unreliable and unfairly prejudicial to a
defendant at trial if admitted. For example, many parents might falsely
confess to a crime to avoid having a police officer report them to children's
services and have the custody of their children stripped away. For this doc-
trine to supplement the objective penalties test, however, the much-
criticized case of Colorado v. Connelly would have to be overruled and the
law on this issue would have to be restored to its pre-Connelly state.339
The second supplementary due process doctrine would be the Rochin
doctrine.34° If an interrogating officer managed to engage in conduct that
"shocks the conscience" '341 without imposing a penalty, such as employing
extreme psychological pressure or outrageous tricks, a court could suppress
the confession. Again, neither of these supplementary doctrines would be
confession doctrines per se. Both would apply in a variety of circumstances
beyond the interrogation context. 342 But the use of both doctrines would
nicely complement the objective penalties test by curbing police conduct
that manages to escape the objective penalties test but is nonetheless offen-
sive or highly coercive.
CONCLUSION
The involuntary confession rule is perhaps the most criticized doctrine
in all of criminal procedure. With a doctrine that is so troubling and prob-
lematic, one might rationally assume that the Court has never parted ways
with it because it is required by the Bill of Rights, and the Court has no
choice but to suffer through it. Or, one might rationally assume that the
338. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 n.6 (1994) (compiling cases that establish due
process right to a fair trial).
339. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Connelly has been roundly criticized in the scholarly literature. See
Godsey, supra note 192, at 889-92 (discussing the scholarly criticisms of Connelly); see also Herman,
supra note 122, at 517 (discussing how the Connelly decision was at odds with prior case law).
340. This doctrine derives from a Supreme Court case, California v. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
341. Id. at 172.
342. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
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doctrine has survived through time because no better alternative exists.
Neither of these assumptions is accurate.
In adhering to the voluntariness test, the Court has betrayed the text,
historical origins, and policies of the self-incrimination clause. These
sources demonstrate that a more consistent and theoretically satisfying test
for confession admissibility would be an objective analysis of the conduct
of the interrogator in question. These sources reveal that the proper test for
confession admissibility should be based on the concept of compulsion,
found within the text of the self-incrimination clause. These sources,
coupled with interpretations of the self-incrimination clause outside of the
interrogation context, indicate that the proper test for compulsion is an ob-
jective penalties test. This test would hold any confession inadmissible
when it has been obtained by imposing an objective penalty on the suspect
under interrogation to provoke speech or punish silence.
As demonstrated in this Article, the objective penalties test would be
substantially easier to apply in the interrogation rooms and courtrooms of
America than the current involuntary confession rule. Not only is it a more
practical and workable test than the standard that current doctrine provides,
but it brings text, history, precedent, and policy into harmony with one
another in a comprehensive new theory of constitutional confession law.
[Vol. 93:465
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 540 2005
